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Mediation Clause Decoded:
A Systematic Content Analysis 
Maryam Salehijam*
When commercial parties conclude dispute resolution clauses that call for mediation, their aim is 
to resolve potential disagreements in a cost and time effective manner. Today, mediation clauses 
are faced with a high threshold for their enforceability. Comparative studies have shown that an 
enforceable mediation clause must address every aspect of the selected mechanism. Consequent-
ly, the parties are faced with the burden of meeting high requirements for certainty. However, 
as dispute resolution clauses are usually the last thing included in a contract, these essential 
elements are not necessarily negotiated. As a result, they face the risk of unenforceability. This 
is especially evident in the rising number of cases in which the parties dispute their obligations 
under a mediation clause. To provide clarity regarding the rights and obligations implied by a 
mediation clause, this paper reports on a unique study of 172 agreements. Rights and obligations 
coded include the obligation to set up the mediation, pay the neutral, attend in person, negotiate 
in good faith, refrain from litigation and rights such as access to interim measures and more. 
This article in addition to reporting on this unique study, assesses whether the agreements under 
analysis fulfill the current conditions for enforceability in selected states.
...
Lorsque les parties à une transaction commerciale s’entendent sur une clause de résolution 
des différends prévoyant le recours à la médiation, leur objectif est de résoudre des désaccords 
potentiels de manière efficace en termes de coûts et de délais. Aujourd’hui, les clauses prévoyant 
la médiation font face à un seuil élevé pour être reconnues comme exécutoires. Des études 
comparatives ont montré que, pour être exécutoire, la clause de médiation doit prévoir tous 
les aspects du mécanisme sélectionné. En conséquence, les parties ont le fardeau de rédiger des 
stipulations contractuelles répondant aux exigences élevées concernant leur certitude. Toutefois, 
comme les clauses de résolution des différends sont souvent les dernières à être intégrées dans les 
contrats, ces éléments pourtant essentiels ne sont pas nécessairement négociés. Il en résulte que les 
clauses risquent de ne pas être reconnues comme exécutoires. Cette situation est particulièrement 
manifeste dans les affaires de plus en plus nombreuses où les parties contestent leurs obligations 
découlant de la clause de médiation. Afin de clarifier les droits et obligations implicites relatifs 
à ces clauses, cet article propose un rapport sur une étude unique de 172 contrats. Les droits et 
obligations étudiés comprennent l’obligation de mettre en œuvre la médiation, de payer un tiers 
neutre, d’assister à la médiation en personne, de négocier de bonne foi, de s’abstenir de poursuites 
judiciaires, ainsi que des droits comme celui de l’accès à des mesures intérimaires, entre autres. 
En plus de ce rapport, l’article évalue si les contrats analysés répondent aux exigences actuelles 
pour être reconnues comme exécutoires dans certains états.
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I. Introduction
Parties are faced with an ever-growing number of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) mechanisms to resolve their commercial disputes. 
ADR in this study is used to describe non-binding dispute resolution 
mechanisms involving a third-party neutral. Therefore, binding mechanisms 
such as arbitration and those not involving a neutral, such as negotiation, 
are excluded. Today, the most common ADR mechanism is mediation. 
These mechanisms range from facilitative to evaluative models and act as 
alternatives to litigation and arbitration.1 The freedom of parties to choose 
from a wide range of mechanisms has the potential for cost and time 
savings, as parties can control the way in which their dispute escalates and 
is to be solved.2 Moreover, by pre-selecting their dispute resolution process, 
parties	attempt	 to	avoid	a	secondary	conflict	over	how	they	are	 to	resolve	
their dispute.3 It is therefore no surprise that the question of how disputes 
are to be resolved is often an aspect of commercial relationships.4 Dispute 
resolution clauses can prescribe one mechanism or multiple mechanisms; 
they can be simple or complex. Moreover, countless dispute resolution 
providers advertise to parties the incorporation of their standard clauses. 
However, with the exception of arbitration, little is known about the content 
of these clauses as well as the rights and obligations implied therein. 
Moreover, in a questionnaire conducted in the context of the author’s PhD 
regarding the perception of dispute resolution professional and experts to 
*  Maryam Salehijam (Female. Born 22-10-1992) is a Canadian/Iranian PhD researcher at the 
Transnational Law Center of Ghent University. She holds an LL.B. in European Law and an 
LL.M. in International Laws from Maastricht University
1   See Carlos Esplugues, “Civil and Commercial Mediation in the EU after the Transposition of 
Directive 2008/52/EC” in Carlos Esplugue, ed, Civil and Commercial Mediation in Europe: 
Cross Border Mediation, vol 2, 1st ed (Cambridge, UK: Intersentia Publishing Ltd, 2014) at 
490 [Esplugues, “Civil and Commercial Mediation in Europe”]. See Nadja Alexander, “Four 
Mediation Stories From Across the Globe” (2010) 74:4 The Rabel Journal of Foreign and Intl 
Private L  at 732—733 [Alexander, “Four Mediation Stories”]. See SI Strong, “Beyond Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration? The Promise of International Commercial Mediation” (2014) 
45 Washington UJL & Policy 11. See Thomas J Stipanowich & J Ryan Lamare, “Living with 
ADR:	Evolving	Perceptions	and	Use	of	Mediation,	Arbitration,	and	Conflict	Management	in	
Fortune 100 Corporations” (2014) Harv Negot L Rev 9. 
2  Mauricio Gomm Santos, “The Role of Mediation in Arbitration: The Use and the Challenges of 
Multi-Tiered Clauses in International Agreements” (2013) Doutrina Nacional 9.
3  Laurence Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice 3rd ed (Riverwood, AUS: Ligare Pty 
Ltd, 2011) at 614.
4  See Santos, supra note 2 at 8; See also Boulle, supra note 3 at 614, Catherine Bellsham-Rev-
ell, “Complex Dispute Resolution Clauses: Has the desire to control the dispute process led 
to increased uncertainty?” (2008) 11:5 Intl Arb L Rev 1. See David Joseph, Jurisdiction and 
Arbitration Agreements and Their Enforcement, 1st ed (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) 
at 448. See Alabaro Lopez De Argumedo Pineiro, “Multi-Step Dispute Resolution Clauses” (10 
January 2011), online: Mondaq  <http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=117062> 
[https://perma.cc/Q4SQ-DFNF].
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ADR agreements, 65% of the respondents indicated that such agreements 
are often copied and pasted.5  
 To better understand these agreements, we carried out a systematic 
content analysis (SCA)6 of 172 mediation clauses.7 By employing a method not 
commonly used in legal science, this study gains new insights regarding the 
rights and obligations implied by these agreements. Moreover, since there 
are relatively few cases and rules that address the parties’ mediation clause,8 
this	study	is	the	first	to	address	these	questions	in	a	systematic	manner.	The	
application	 of	 SCA	 is	 fitting	 since	 essential	 aspects	 of	mediation	 and	 the	
duties of the parties are primarily regulated by their agreement to resort 
to mediation and the procedural rules of the relevant mediation provider.9 
Some of the questions asked are as follows: Do the parties to a mediation 
agreement have to set up the mediation? Attend a minimum number of 
sessions? Personally Attend? Cooperate? Act in good faith? Attempt to 
settle? Refrain from seizing court or arbitral tribunals? Refrain from seeking 
interim	 measures?	 Comply	 with	 privacy	 and	 confidentiality	 obligations?	
This	article,	in	addition	to	reporting	the	findings	of	this	unique	study,	further	
assesses if the current requirements for enforceability are generally met by 
the agreements under analysis. 
5  See Maryam Salehijam, “ADR Clauses and International Perceptions: A Preliminary Report” 
(2017)	3	Nederlands-Vlaams	tijdschrift	voor	Mediation	en	conflictmanagement	1	[Salehijam,	
“ADR Clauses”], where the result of the questionnaire were extensively discussed. 
6  See Carlos Esplugues, “General Report: New Developments in Civil and Commercial Mediation 
– Global Comparative Perspectives” in Carlos Esplugues & Louis Marquis, eds, New Develop-
ments in Civil and Commercial Mediation: Global Comparative Perspectives (Switzerland: 
Springer, 2015) 1 at 33 [Esplugues, “General Report”].
7		Section	2.1	of	this	article	further	defines	“mediation”.
8  See Esplugues, “General Report” ,supra note 6 at 58. See Peter G Mayr & Nemeth Kristin, 
“Regulation of Dispute Resolution in Austria: A Traditional Litigation Culture Slowly Embrac-
es	ADR”	in	Felix	Steffek	et	al,	eds,	Regulating Dispute Resolution: ADR and Access to Justice 
at the Crossroads (Portland, USA: Hart Publishing, 2013) 65 at 79. See Burkhard Hess & Nils 
Pelzer, “Regulation of Dispute Resolution in Germany: Cautious Steps towards the Construc-
tion	of	an	ADR	System”	in	Felix	Steffek	et	al,	ed,	Regulating Dispute Resolution ADR and 
Access to Justice at the Crossroads (Portland, USA: Hart Publishing, 2013) 209 at 227 [Hess & 
Peltzer, “Regulation of Dispute Resolution in Germany”].
9  See Burkhard Hess & Nils Pelzer, “Mediation in Germany: Finding the Right Balance between 
Regulation and Self-Regulation” in Carlos Esplugues & Louis Marquis, ed, New Developments 
in Civil and Commercial Mediation: Global Comparative Perspectives (Switzerland: Springer, 
2015) 291 at 296 [Hess & Peltzer, “Mediation in Germany”]. See Charles Jarrosson, “Legal 
Issues Raised by ADR” in Arnold Ingen-Housz, ed, ADR in Business: Practice and Issues 
across Countries and Cultures  (Alphen aan den Rijn, NL: Kluwer Law International, 2006) 
157 [Legal Issues 2006]at 163. See Jan M Smits, Contract Law: A Comparative Introduc-
tion (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) at 18. Moreover, the content of the ADR 
agreement	is	settled	by	the	parties.	See	Klaus	J	Hopt	&	Felix	Steffek,	“Mediation:	Comparison	
of Laws: Regulatory Models, Fundamental Issues” in Klaus	J	Hopt	&	Felix	Steffek,	ed,	Media-
tion: Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013) at 31.
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	 As	mentioned	above,	this	study	has	a	twofold	aim:	first,	to	better	
understand the content and obligations of these agreements, and second, 
to	 assess	 whether	 the	 agreements	 under	 analysis	 fulfilled	 the	 current	
conditions for enforceability. To better understand the research conducted 
for this study, Section 2 provides a detailed overview of the research design 
including data collection, content coding, and literature review. Moreover, 
Section	2	establishes	our	definition	of	a	“mediation	agreement/clause”.	The	
findings	of	the	SCA	are	explored	in	Section	3	in	the	following	order:	the	codes	
applied to categorize the mediation agreement, its content, and composition 
(Sections 3.1.–3.4.); the codes relating to preconditions for the mediation, 
commencement procedures as well as applicable rules (Sections 3.5.–3.6.); 
the codes applied to practical matters, such as the procedure to appoint the 
neutral, his/her payment and logistics (Sections 3.7.–3.8.); the codes focused 
on	the	various	legal	issues	relating	to	the	effect	of	the	mediation	agreement	
on subsequent proceedings, such as interim relief, limitation periods, 
obligations to refrain from acting (Sections 3.9.–3.11.); codes relating to 
the behavioral, temporal, and attendance obligations prescribed by the 
agreements and applicable institutional rules (Sections 3.12.–3.15.); and 
the codes focused on the ways the parties may terminate their mechanism 
as well as remedies/penalties for non-compliance (Sections 3.16.–3.17.). In 
section 4, this article assesses whether, in general, the agreements under 
analysis meet the current threshold for enforceability. The article concludes 
by determining whether wide-ranging trends or themes are evident in the 
agreements under analysis. 
II. Research Design and Literature Review 
 SCA is a systematic and replicable technique applied to the analysis 
of a variety of texts, ranging from interview transcripts to legal texts such 
as case law and legislation.10 It is a research tool borrowed from empirical 
researchers.11	 In	 this	 article,	SCA	 is	defined	as	 a	 research	method	used	 to	
objectively and systematically detect themes and trends in texts including 
legal instruments and contracts as well as communications.12 In practical 
terms, SCA involves the application of codes to the data, that is, to mediation 
10 See Steve Stemler, “An Overview of Content Analysis” (2001) 7:17 Practical Assessment, 
Research & Evaluation at 1. See Gus Van Harten, “Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical 
Adjudication: An Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2012) Osgoode Compar-
ative Research in Law and Political Economy Research report 41/2012 at 15. See Mark A Hall, 
“Coding Case Law for Public Health Law Evaluation” (2011) Pub Health L Research at 3.
11 “Empirical simply means based on facts, rather than on theory or untested belief (e.g. political 
opinion or ideology.” See Deborah R. Hensler, Designing Empirical Legal Research: A Primer 
for Lawyers (2013) at 7. 
12	According	to	the	widely	accepted	1952	Berelson	definition,	content	analysis	is	“a	research	
technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication”. See Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research ( New 
York: Free University Press,1952) at 18.
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agreements in this case. The section below further explains our research 
subject - “the mediation agreement/clause”.
A. The Mediation Clause/Agreement
 Mediation is the most prominent ADR mechanism. It is a non-
binding mechanism involving a neutral third-party (without any decision 
making powers) who assists the parties in their attempt to settle their dispute. 
Mediation	has	been	defined	by	UNCITRAL	Working	Group	II	as		“a	widely	
used term for a process where parties request a third person or persons to 
assist them in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute 
arising out of, or relating to, a contractual or other legal relationship.”13 
Moreover, the Mediation Directive stipulates:
‘Mediation’ means a structured process, however named or referred 
to, whereby two or more parties to a dispute attempt by themselves, 
on a voluntary basis, to reach an agreement on the settlement of their 
dispute with the assistance of a mediator. This process may be initiated 
by the parties or suggested or ordered by a court or prescribed by the 
law of a Member State. It includes mediation conducted by a judge who 
is not responsible for any judicial proceedings concerning the dispute in 
question. It excludes attempts made by the court or the judge seised to 
settle a dispute in the course of judicial proceedings concerning the dispute 
in question.14 
The only disagreement here is regarding the role of the neutral in guiding the 
parties in reaching a resolution of their dispute. To illustrate, “mediation” is 
at times referred to as “conciliation”, although the latter is a purely evaluative 
mechanism, while mediation can be either facilitative or evaluative.15 In 
facilitative mediation, the neural third-party has no authority to impose a 
solution	on	the	disputing	parties	and	does	not	offer	his/her	advice	on	the	
outcome, while in evaluative methods, the neutral third-party makes forma 
land informal recommendations. 
 When parties make the choice to resort to mediation, they can 
record this choice in writing. However, there is disagreement regarding the 
13 Working Group II, “International Commercial Mediation: Preparation of Instruments on 
Enforcement of International Commercial Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation 
Note by the Secretariat” (2017) UNCITRAL Working Paper A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.205 at 3.
14 EC, Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 
on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, [2008] OJ L 136/3 at article 
3(a) [EU Mediation Directive]. 
15	See	Maud	Piers,	“Europe’s	Role	in	Alternative	Dispute	Resolution:	Off	to	a	Good	Start?”	(2014)	
2014:2 J Disp Resol at 274. See Esplugues, “General Report”, supra note 6 at 11. See Nadja 
Alexander, “International and Comparative Mediation: Legal Perspectives” (2009) Kluwer L 
Intl at 10 [Alexander, “International and Comparative Mediation”]. In facilitative mediation, 
the neural third-party has no authority to impose a solution on the disputing parties and does 
not	offer	his/her	advice	on	the	outcome,	while	in	evaluative	methods,	the	neutral	third-party	
makes forma land informal recommendations. 
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appropriate title that should be applied to describe the parties’ agreement 
to pursue mediation.16 This work uses the term “mediation agreement” to 
refer	to	the	parties’	pre-	and	post-conflict	agreement	to	pursue	mediation.	
Nevertheless, as many authors utilize the term “alternative dispute resolution 
clause”, “mediation clause”, “agreement to mediate”, or “mediation 
agreement” to refer to the “mediation agreement”, their wording is used 
when discussing their work. 
 Moreover, it should be noted that in this work, the term “mediation 
agreement” does not refer to the agreement between the neutral and the 
parties (the “appointment agreement”), the agreement that the parties sign 
at the beginning of their mediation (the “commencement agreement”), 
nor the agreement that records the parties’ settlement (the “settlement 
agreement”).17 Furthermore, mediation agreements are not the same as 
“agreements to agree”, which is an agreement requiring the parties to enter 
into a subsequent agreement,18 nor “agreements to negotiate.”19 
 A mediation clause/agreement20 can be concluded before or after 
a dispute arises and can be a stand-alone contract or part of the main 
commercial contract (a clause).21 Furthermore, mediation agreements can 
be a tier in a multi-tiered dispute resolution clause (“MDR”) as a step prior to 
adjudicative mechanisms such as arbitration and litigation.22 MDR clauses 
–	also	known	as	“(multi-)step”,	“mediation	first”,	“waterfall”	or	“escalation”	
clauses – refer to dispute resolution agreements that contain multiple tiers 
16 See Esplugues, “General Report” supra note 6 at 28.
17	Frank	Diedrich	defines	the	mediation	agreement	as	the	“contract	to	mediate	between	the	
parties”, while referring to the contract between the parties and the mediator as the “mediator 
agreement”. See Frank Diedrich, “International/Cross-Border Mediation within the EU - Place 
of	Mediation,	Qualifications	of	the	Mediator	and	the	Applicable	Law”	in	Frank	Diedrich,	ed,	
The Status Quo of Mediation of Europe and Overseas: Options for Countries in Transition 
(Hamburg	:	Verlag	Dr.	Kovač,	2014)	at	73—74.	See	P	Jean	Baker,	“Young	Lawyers:	Selecting	
the Right Mediator” in Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee, ABA Groups, Section Of 
Litigation vol 15 no 2 (American Bar Association, 2011). 
18	“Agreements	to	agree”	are	often	identified	by	common	law	courts	as	unenforceable.	
19 See Boulle, supra note 3 at 621. 
20 In this article, the terms clause and agreement are used synonymously. 
21 See Peter Tochtermann, “Mediation in Germany: The German Mediation Act -Alternative Dis-
pute	Resolution	at	the	Crossroads”	in	Klaus	J	Hopt	&	Felix	Steffek,	ed,	Mediation: Principles 
and Regulation in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 549 
[Tochtermann, “Mediation in Germany”].
22	See	David	Cairns,	“Mediating	International	Commercial	Disputes:	Differences	in	U.S.	and	
European Approaches” (2005) 60:3 Disp Resol J at 64. Jiménes Dyalá Figueres, “Multi-Tiered 
Dispute Resolution Clauses in ICC Arbitration”, (2003) 14:1 ICC International Court of Arbi-
tration Bulletin at 71.
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of dispute resolution mechanisms.23 There are many options to design these 
clauses, ranging from two to several tiers. MDR clauses typically require the 
parties	to	first	attempt	non-binding	processes	such	as	negotiation	followed	
by	mediation,	and	envisages	arbitral	or	court	proceedings	as	the	final	stage.24 
 MDR clauses are common in contracts where the issues are complex 
or when the contract is intended to endure over a longer period, such as 
joint	venture,	franchising,	building	and	construction,	as	well	as	finance	and	
lease agreements.25 The freedom to choose from a wide range of mechanisms 
enables the parties to control the way in which their dispute escalates and is 
to be solved.26 Consequently, the parties may settle their dispute sooner and 
more cheaply than by waiting for a binding decision. MDR clauses can be 
drafted in diverse ways as they are based on party autonomy.27 This study 
also considers MDR clauses, by checking whether the agreements under 
analysis form part of a MDR clause. 
B. Data Collection
 The collection of mediation agreements for the analysis was limited 
to selected states with developed economies and justice systems but with 
varying approaches to enforcement of mediation agreements. The focus is 
limited to four EU Member States, namely Austria, England,28 Germany, and 
the Netherlands, as well as three leaders in the rise of mediation, namely 
Australia, the United States of America, and Singapore. As previously 
mentioned, the choice for the above Member States was intentional and 
23 See Michael Pryles, “Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses” (2001) 18:2 J Intl Arb at 159. 
See Oliver Krauss, “The Enforceability of Escalation Clauses Providing for Negotiations in 
Good Faith Under English Law” (2016) 2 McGill J Disp Resol at 143. See Jason D. File, “United 
States: multi-step dispute resolution clauses” (2007) IBA Legal Practice Division: Mediation 
Commitee Newsletter at 36. Gary B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd ed (Al-
phen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2014) at 279 [Born, “International Commercial 
Arbitration”]. See Edna Sussman & Victoria A. Kummer, “Drafting the Arbitration Clause: A 
primer On the Opportunities And The Pitfall” (2012) 67:1 Disp Resol J at 6.
24 Krauss, supra note 23 at 144. Alexander Jollies, “Consequences of Multi-tier Arbitration 
Clauses: Issues of Enforcement” (2006) 72:4 Arbitration at 329. See Julian DM Lew, et al, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 2013) at paras 8, 62. 
25 See Boulle, supra note 3 at 614. 
26 See Joseph, supra note 4 at 448. See Laine Fogh Knudsen & Signe Balian, “Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Systems Across the European Union, Iceland and Norway”, (2014) 109 
Procedia - Social and Behavioral Science at 945. See Giuseppe De Palo & Romina Canessa, 
“New Trends for ADR in the European Union,” in Pablo Cortés, ed, The New Regulatory 
Framework for Consumer Dispute Resolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 412.
27 See Krauss, supra note 23. See Gary B Born, International Arbitration and Forum Selection 
Agreements: Drafting and Enforcing, 4th ed (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 
2013) at 103 [Born, “International Arbitration and Forum Selection Agreements”].
28 This study focuses on the legal and practical situation regarding ADR in England and Wales; 
however, in order to facilitate discussion, the reference to ‘England’ is to be understood as a 
reference to ‘England and Wales’.
127Vol 5 (2018-2019)                 Mediation Clause Decoded:
                   A Systematic Content Analysis     
motivated by their varying approaches to mediation. To illustrate, in Austria, 
a pioneer in mediation law and practice,29 mediation and mediators are 
extensively regulated,30 while in England, there is little state intervention. 
In addition, while in Germany and England, mediation is interlinked with 
the courts, in the Netherlands, mediation was advanced without compulsory 
rules	 using	 financial	 incentives	 and	 as	 a	mechanism	 not	 forced	 upon	 the	
parties.31 
 Random sampling was employed to gather the agreements, as 
it was impossible to estimate the population of mediation agreements.32 
Moreover, while numerous mediation agreements are freely available on the 
websites of dispute resolution providers and in practitioner guidebooks, such 
a sample does not include the agreements drafted by in-house counsel or 
specialized	law	firms.	Thus,	in	addition	to	collecting	freely	available	clauses,	
this study also set out to collect clauses directly from ADR professionals 
and experts. A test call requesting such clauses on various platforms with 
ADR	 professionals	 as	 audience	 proved	 only	 slightly	 effective,	 since	many	
professionals	 indicated	 their	 inability	 to	 participate	 due	 to	 confidentiality	
or	firm	policy.33 In light of this response, the decision was made to change 
the approach to gathering these clauses. Research into potential avenues 
resulted in the selection of a questionnaire instead of a general call for 
clauses. Through the questionnaire, ADR professionals and experts could 
indicate why they may not be willing or able to provide such clauses (i.e. 
confidentiality,	too	much	effort,	or	other).	
 The online, self-administered questionnaire,34 which was open 
from 9 February to 30 April 2017, targeted ADR professionals and experts–
including lawyers, in-house counsel, academics, and neutrals–with 
experience in drafting, inserting, or enforcing dispute resolution clauses that 
29 See Markus Roth & David Gherdane, “Mediation in Austria: The European Pioneer in Me-
diation Law and Practice” in Klaus J Hopt et al, ed, Mediation: Principles and Regulation in 
Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
30 See Christine Mattl, et al, “Mediation in Austria” in Nadja Alexander, ed, Global Trends in 
Mediation (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006) at 64: “Austria is one of the few Eu-
ropean countries to have enacted progressive mediation legislation which not only recognises 
mediation	as	a	profession	but	provides	detailed	criteria	for	training	and	qualifications	of	civil	
mediators.”
31 See John M. Bosnak, The European Mediation Directive: More Questions Than Answers, in 
Arnold Ingen-Housz, ed, ADR in Business: Practice and Issues across Countries and Cultures 
(Alphen aan den Rijn, NL: Kluwer Law International, 2010) at 625: “Compared to other conti-
nental European countries, the Netherlands has a well-developed mediation structure”.
32 For more discussion of sample and population see Frans L. Leeuw & Hans Schmeets, Empir-
ical Legal Research: A Guidance Book for Lawyers, Legislators and Regulators (Northamp-
ton: Elgar, 2016) at 158—159.
33 Sample response “We have in-house precedents which we use with guidance notes for contract 
drafters	but	we	don’t	share	those	outside	the	firm.	The	basic	approach	in	terms	of	mandatory/
non-mandatory/tiered clauses is similar to the approach taken by many organisations.”
34 A questionnaire that the respondent completes on his/her own without intervention or 
involvement of the administrator.
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provide for ADR mechanisms. To ensure that only the targeted audience 
responded to the questionnaire, two additional safeguards were implemented: 
(1) the call for participation emphasized that the questionnaire targeted legal 
professionals with experience in drafting, inserting, or enforcing dispute 
resolution agreements that provided for ADR and mediation; and (2) the 
questionnaire	was	manipulated	to	contain	conditional	questions	that	filtered	
out participants.
C. Content Coding
 The coding employed in this study followed four stages as outlined 
by Hall and Wright:
1. […]	create	a	tentative	set	of	coding	categories	a	priori.	Refine	
these categories after thorough evaluation, including feedback 
from colleagues, study team members, or expert consultants. 
2. Write a coding sheet and set of coding instructions (called a 
“codebook”), and train coders to apply these to a sample of 
the material to be coded. Pilot test the reliability (consistency) 
among coders by having multiple people code some of the 
material. 
3. Add, delete, or revise coding categories based on this pilot 
experience, and repeat reliability testing and coder training as 
required. 
4. When	the	codebook	is	finalized,	apply	it	to	all	the	material.35
The initial list of codes was created on the basis of scholarly works and 
case law that address the rights and obligations implied by mediation 
agreements.36 Section 2.4 further explains the terminology employed in the 
literature	on	the	topic.	The	codes	are	descriptive	and	reflect	the	obligations	
and rights as well as essential aspects contained in the agreements. They are 
used to facilitate the counting of obligations in order to assess the frequency 
of reoccurrence thereof. Moreover, the choice was made to apply split coding 
instead of lumper coding in order to generate a more nuanced analysis.37 The 
data was analyzed twice to ensure the objectivity and reliability of the codes 
assigned.38 
35 See Mark A Hall & Roland F Wright, “Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions” 
(2008) 96 Cal L Rev at 107.
36	The	final	code	book	is	available	upon	request.	See	also	Johnny	Saldaña,	An	Introduction	to	
Codes	and	Coding,	in	Johnny	Saldaña,	ed,	The	Coding	Manual	for	Qualitative	Researchers,	
(London: SAGE, 2015) at 144.
37 Ibid at 23.
38 See Marta Cominetti & Peter Seele, “Hard Soft Law or Soft Hard Law? A Content Analysis of 
CSR Guidelines Typologized Along Hybrid Legal Status”, (2016) 24:127 Schwerpunktthema at 
134.
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D. Literature Review
 To set the parameters for this study and to establish a coding 
list, relevant works addressing the content of mediation agreements were 
analyzed. The paragraphs below provide an overview of the analysis. The 
literature is presented in a chronological order to demonstrate the persisting 
gap that this study addresses. 
 Early on, in 2005, David Joseph argued that mediation agreements 
result	 in	 privacy	 and	 confidentiality	 obligations.39 Soon after, in 2006, 
Jarrosson addressed the question “what is the extent of the parties’ obligations 
when they agree to resort to ADR?”40	He	argued	that,	in	principle,	the	effect	
of an ADR agreement depends on the terms the parties have agreed on.41 On 
this basis, he created four labels for various types of ADR agreements: 
1. provisions that create no obligation, such as those that make 
a mere declaration of intention to consider the possibility of 
ADR once a dispute arises;42 
2. provisions that create limited obligations, such as those that 
only require the parties to discuss/consider ADR;43 
3. provisions that create an obligation for a short period, such as 
those containing a time limit to institute ADR as a condition 
precedent to arbitration/litigation while also indicating that if 
a party does not reply to a request to initiate, participate, or 
continue the process, the parties are free from the obligation 
to mediate;44 and 
4. provisions that create real obligations such as those requiring 
ADR as a precondition to arbitration or litigation.45 
Regarding	the	first	and	second	type	of	agreements,	there	are	numerous	rulings	
from	common	law	jurisdictions	that	confirm	when	parties	merely	agree	to	
consider mediation, they are not legally bound to pursue such mechanism.46 
39 See Joseph, supra note 4 at 450: “most institutional provisions make express provision in this 
regard, see e.g. art 7 of the ICC ADR rules. Likewise, see art 9 of the UNCITRAL model law on 
international commercial conciliation, and art 6 of preliminary draft EU directive.”
40 Jarrosson updates his article “Legal Issues Raised by ADR” in 2010 with minor changes to 
the section on the obligations created by the ADR agreement. See Jarrosson, “Legal Issues 
2006” supra note 9; and see Charles Jarrosson, “Legal Issues Raised by ADR” in Arnold 
Ingen-Housz, ed, ADR in Business: Practice and Issues across Countries and Cultures Vol II 
(Alphen aan den Rijn, NL: Kluwer Law International, 2010) [Legal Issues 2010] at 157.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid at 163. 
43 For example, see ICC Model Clause B: Obligation to Consider the ICC Mediation Rules.
44 If the agreement provides for a time limit to institute ADR, the expiration of this limit ends 
the parties’ obligation to commence ADR.
45 See Jarrosson, “Legal Issues 2010”, supra note 40 at 166. 
46 See Maryam Salehijam, “A Call for a Harmonized Approach to Agreements to Mediate”, 
(2018) 1 YB International Arbitration and ADR [Salehijam, “A Call for a Harmonized Ap-
proach”].
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Thus, if a party refuses to discuss the matter, the mediation is not set in 
motion and there are no adverse consequences for the refusing party.47 This 
article does not code agreements that are not binding on the parties due to 
their voluntary nature (i.e. “the parties may consider mediation”). 
 Regarding the third type of provisions, Jarrosson argues that if a 
party unreasonably refused to participate in setting up the ADR proceedings, 
liability may arise depending on the wording of the ADR clause/agreement.48 
He	lastly	claimed	that	the	fourth	type	of	provisions	is	fulfilled	if	the	parties	
appoint a neutral and attend at least one mediation session.49 In addition 
to his division of ADR agreements, Jarrosson noted that certain obligations 
are incumbent upon the parties, such as the obligation for the proceedings 
to	 be	 kept	 confidential.50	 The	 requirement	 of	 confidentiality	 is	 reinforced	
in several mediation laws as well as mediation agreements.51 In order to 
assess	the	importance	of	confidentiality	for	the	parties,	this	study	coded	the	
agreements	for	“confidentiality”	and	“privacy”.
 Two years later, in 2008, Tochtermann in relation to the German 
approach, opined that: 
At the very least, the parties will be required to initiate the mediation 
by appointing a mediator and furnishing him with statements of fact. 
Moreover,	 they	must	 attend	 a	 first	mediation	 session.	 Since	 the	 parties	
concluded the mediation agreement to overcome the barriers which they 
would face in direct negotiations, they will also be required to participate 
in a caucus session, where the mediator may point out the chances of the 
mediation structures and inform the parties of its basic principles, so that 
the	mediation	has	a	chance	to	start	off	even	where	emotions	are	high.52 
Subsequently, in 2009, Alexander addressed the parties’ duties in mediation 
in	 general,	 not	 specifically	 under	 a	 mediation	 agreement.53 According to 
her, once a mediation has commenced, the parties may be obliged to act 
reasonably in relation to the mediation and to participate in good faith. 
Since she does not directly address the obligations arising from the parties’ 
mediation	agreement,	her	findings	were	only	considered	during	the	creation	
47 According to Article 4(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Conciliation Law, if a party does not 
receive	an	acceptance	to	an	invitation	to	conciliation	within	a	specific	period,	it	can	treat	
such silence as a rejection of the invitation. See UNCITRAL, Model Law on International 
Commercial Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and Use, 2004 at article 4(2) [Model Law 
on Conciliation]. 
48 Jarrosson, “Legal Issues 2010”, supra note 40  at 164. Model Law on Conciliation, supra note 
47 at article 10(1)(a). The article stipulates that there is no liability for the refusal to participate 
in ADR proceedings.
49 See Jarrosson, “Legal issues 2010”, supra note 40 at 166.
50 Ibid.
51 See, for example,  EU Mediation Directive, supra note 14.
52 Peter Tochtermann, “Agreements to Negotiate in the Transnational Context - Issues of Con-
tract	Law	and	Effective	Dispute	Resolution”,	(2008)	13:3	Unif	L	Rev	at	708	[Tochternmann,	
“Agreements to Negotiate”].
53 Alexander, “International and Comparative Mediation”, supra note 15 at 225.
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of the codes applicable to the parties’ behavioral obligations during the 
mediation. 
 In 2013, Andrews discussed the expectations that arise from an 
agreement to mediate. However, he did not address the obligations therein. 
The expectations are as follows:
1. the third-party neutral will be impartial, independent, and 
competent (trained)
2. the	process	will	be	confidential;
3. the aim of the mediation is to arrive at a settlement of all or 
part of the dispute; and 
4. the subsequent settlement will be concluded or at least evi-
denced in writing.54 
Here, there is consensus amongst Andrews and Jarrosson that ADR in 
principle	implies	confidentiality.	
 Seven years following Jarrosson’s initial attempt to make sense of 
the various obligations that arise from ADR agreements, Bach and Gruber 
tackled the same question in the context of German law. According to them, 
such agreements often contain both positive and negative obligations.55 They 
oblige the parties to mediate in order to resolve all or some of their dispute, 
and they oblige the parties to refrain from initiating court or arbitration 
proceedings prior to the termination of the mediation.56 If a more detailed 
approach is applied to the division of Bach and Gruber, it appears that the 
three obligations are implied: the parties must set up the mediation, attempt 
to resolve the dispute, and refrain from pursuing a binding mechanism. 
	 In	 the	 same	 year,	 Hess	 and	 Pelzer	 also	 reflected	 on	 the	 parties’	
obligations in Germany. Similarly, they found that in accordance with 
the principle of voluntariness and §2(5) of the Germany Mediation Law, 
the parties may leave the mediation at any time once the mediation has 
commenced.57 According to Hess and Pelzer, Piers as well as Tochtermann, 
in Germany, the principle of pacta sunt servanda requires the parties must 
appoint	a	mediator,	at	the	minimum	attend	a	first	meeting,	and	comment	
on the substance of the dispute.58	Moreover,	they	find	that	there	is	a	general	
duty to cooperate in the mediation and to negotiate in good faith.59
54 See Neil Andrews, Andrews on Civil Processes: Arbitration and Mediation, (Cambridge, UK: 
Intersentia 2013) at para 2.28.
55 See Ivo Bach & Urs Peter Gruber, “Germany”, in Carlos Esplugues, José Luis Iglesias & Guill-
ermo Palao, ed, Civil and Commercial Mediation in Europe: National Mediation Rules and 
Procedures, vol 1 (Cambridge, UK: Intersentia, 2013) at 165.
56 Pactum de non petendo.
57 Hess & Pelzer, “Regulation of Dispute Resolution in Germany”, supra note 8 at 227.
58 Piers, supra note 15 at 292; Esplugues, “Civil and Commercial Mediation in Europe”, supra 
note 1 at 606. Hess & Pelzer, “Regulation of Dispute Resolution in Germany”, supra note 8 at 
227; Tochtermann, “Mediation in Germany”, supra note 21 at 549. 
59 Hess & Pelzer, “Regulation of Dispute Resolution in Germany”, supra note 8 at 227. See §242 
Civil Code (Germany).
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	 Hopt	 and	 Steffek	 also	 address	 the	 consequences	 of	 mediation	
clauses. Accordingly, these agreements “can contain substantive as well as 
procedural elements. Possible substantive elements are the duties to:
1. prepare the mediation;
2. to participate in the mediation;
3. to negotiate in good faith; and 
4. to only initiate litigation if mediation fails.” 60 
They also argue that the parties do not have to agree to a settlement.61 Hopt 
and	Steffek	appear	 to	be	distinguishing	 the	 same	obligations	as	Bach	and	
Gruber, while adding the obligation to negotiate in good faith similar to 
Hess, Pelzer, and Alexander. 
 Regarding Austria, another Germanic system, Frauenberger-Pfeiler 
notes that a mediation clause obliges the parties to jointly seek mutually 
satisfactory results and in doing so, refrain from actions that endanger 
the goal of a mutual settlement.62 She also argues that basic principles of 
mediation encourage the parties to disclose the information necessary to 
reach a settlement, to take no court action during the mediation, and to 
treat	information	from	the	other	party	with	confidentiality.63 In addition, the 
parties should in principle attend all mediation sessions.64 However, there 
are no written legal rules on these principles and thus these duties cannot be 
enforced in Austria, as it would contravene the principle of voluntariness.65 
Therefore, in Austria, the parties are free to withdraw from the mediation at 
any time despite of an agreement.66 
 In 2014, Piers divided the various obligations contained in a 
mediation agreement into three categories: 
1. the obligation to set up the ADR proceeding; 
2. the	obligation	to	find	a	solution;	and	
3. the obligation to refrain from acting.67 
She points to the same obligations as Bach and Gruber, and Hopt and 
Steffek	while	explicitly	outlining	the	distinct	obligation	of	working	towards	
a	 solution.	The	obligation	 to	find	a	 solution	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	 settlement	
expectation discussed by Andrews. However, this obligation does not mean 
that the parties can be forced to agree to a proposed solution as also noted 
60	Hopt	&	Steffek,	supra note 9 at 31, 63.
61 Ibid at 63. 
62 See Ulrike Frauenberger-Pfeiler, “Austria”, in Carlos Esplugues, José Luis Iglesias & Guill-
ermo Palao, ed, Civil and Commercial Mediation in Europe: National Mediation Rules and 
Procedures vol 1 (Cambridge, UK: Intersentia, 2013) at 11.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid at 12. 
66 See Mayr & Kristin, supra note  at 79. 
67 Piers, supra note 15 at 290—295.
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by Frauenberger-Pfeiler.68 According to Piers, the above contractual duties 
of the parties to a mediation agreement do not address the concrete actions 
that the parties must take in the pursuit of a settlement.69 This leads to 
conflicting	opinions	in	the	legal	doctrine.70 
 While some are of the opinion that the parties are free to negotiate 
in	the	manner	that	best	fits	their	personal	interests,71 others argue that the 
parties must further the mediation according to their abilities.72 For instance, 
an obligation arising from the “ADR order” that may be issued in accordance 
with Article G1.8 of the Admiralty and Commercial Courts of England is the 
duty	to	agree	on	a	neutral	in	good	faith.	Therefore,	Piers	finds	that	while	the	
parties	cannot	be	forced	by	the	court	to	find	a	solution	through	mediation,	
they are obliged to, at the minimum, attempt to resolve their dispute 
through mediation.73 In addition, although there is no duty to give particular 
information during the mediation procedure, the parties are expected not to 
misrepresent the facts.74	Lastly,	Piers	finds	that	there	is	a	general	duty	to	pay	
the neutral. 75
 Subsequently, in 2015, Berger found that “the agreement to mediate 
is a contract that obliges the parties to settle their dispute through mediation 
and not before the domestic courts or an international arbitral tribunal.”76 
Here, he implies that the parties have an obligation to refrain from acting as 
suggested by several authors above. Accordingly, a “party is merely required 
to	make	an	honest,	reasonable	and	conscientious	effort	to	resolve	the	dispute	
through mediation.”77 Thus, he points to behavioral obligations. 
	 Contrary	to	Piers,	Born	and	Šćekić	claim	that	obligations	under	an	
agreement to mediate are usually limited.78 They base their argument on the 
claim that such agreements imply that the parties are to discuss an issue, 
not	to	reach	a	specific	outcome.	Hence,	the	authors	seem	to	argue	against	
an	 implied	 obligation	 to	 find	 a	 solution.	 The	 claim	 of	 Born	 and	 Šćekić	 is	
supported by Esplugues who argues that an agreement to mediate does not 
mean the parties are obliged to settle.79	In	agreement,	Magnus	finds	that	in	
68 Ibid at 294.
69 Piers, supra note 15 at 294. 
70 Tochtermann, “Agreements to Negotiate,” supra note 52.
71 Ibid at 549. 
72 See K.Trams, The Mediation Agreement – A Contract Legally Possible Analysis, (Marbug: 
Tectum Verlag, 2008) at 138. See Piers, supra note 16 at 294.
73 Piers, supra note 15 at 291.
74 Ibid at 294.
75 Ibid at 292.
76 See Peter Klaus Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in International Business: Negotiation, 
Mediation, Arbitration, 3rd ed, (Alphen aan den Rijn : Kluwer Law International, 2015) at para 
6.39.
77 Ibid at 132.
78	See	Gary	B	Born	&	Marija	Šćekić,	Pre-Arbitration Procedural Requirements: ‘A Dismal 
Swamp’, in David D. Caron et al, ed, Practising Virtue: Inside International Arbitration 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) at 239.
79 See Esplugues, “General Report” supra note 6 at 33.
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a mediation a party must cooperate and further the process, but it does not 
have to accept a compromise.80 
	 In	 line	 with	 the	 Born	 and	 Šćekić,	 in	 2017,	 Kajkowska	 restated	
the lack of a minimum standard of compliance and further noted that in 
states where mediation agreements are enforced, what is required of the 
parties is at a minimum the instituting of the mechanism by appointing the 
mediator.81 Her view is considered by van Beukering-Rosmuller and Van 
Leynseele,	who	find	 that	a	mediation	clause	creates	a	duty	 for	 the	parties	
to reach an agreement on the appointment of the neutral or the process for 
appointment.82 Thus, the duty to attempt mediation is breached if a party 
torpedoes the appointment.83 However, they add that the parties must also 
agree to meet with the mediator at least once.84
 This study opted to include all of the. above distinguished 
obligations/expectations with the exception of those relating to the neutral’s 
characteristics or behavior, as many legislative acts already address the 
duties of the neutral.85 Moreover, the obligations of the neutral do not arise 
from the parties’ mediation agreement, but from the agreement the parties 
conclude with the neutral once the dispute arises. This study further divided 
the various obligations to numerous sub-codes. The next Section provides a 
detailed discussion of the coding results. 
III. Findings 
 In total, 172 mediation agreements were formatted for coding.86 At 
the end of the second round of coding, there were 38 codes and 199 sub-
codes.87	The	discussion	of	our	findings	follows	the	typical	structure	of	a	me-
diation agreement. It is important to note that where relevant the sections 
below	reflect	on	the	compatibility	of	the	content	of	the	agreements	with	the	
legislation	in	selected	states.	These	reflections	are	summarized	in	Section	4.
80 Ulrich Magnus, “Mediation in Australia: Development and Problems” in Klaus J Hopt et al, 
ed, Mediation: Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2013). See also Alexander, “Four Mediation Stories”, supra note 1. 
 at 732, 747. 
81 See Ewelina Kajkowska, Enforceability of Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses (Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2017) at 137.
82 See Ellen van Beukering-Rosmuller & Patrick Van Leynseele, “Enforceability of mediation 
clauses in Belgium and the Netherlands” (2007) 21:3 Nederlands-Vlaams tijdschrift voor 
mediation	en	conflictmanagement	at	50.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid at 51.
85  “Parties’ duties in mediation are less developed and discussed than mediator’s duties.” See 
Hopt	&	Steffek,	supra note 9 at 63.
86 It is again emphasized that this study does not provide a detailed content coding of the par-
ties’ agreement to negotiate nor arbitrate, even if they are contained in a MDR clause alongside 
a mediation agreement.
87 The codebook is available on request.
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E. Composition of the Mediation Agreements
 The SCA revealed that 81% of the agreements coded required 
mediation in the context of a MDR clause.88 This is unsurprising since 
the promotion of mediation as the preferred alternative to litigation and 
arbitration has resulted in dispute resolution providers and commercial 
parties increasing the drafting of agreements that contain MDR clauses that 
call for mediation prior to other binding procedures.89 However, it should be 
noted that the trend to conclude MDR agreements does not mean that they 
are widespread. The questionnaire conducted in the context of this research 
asked “How often do you estimate that commercial dispute resolution 
clauses that you have drafted, inserted, applied and/or enforced make a 
reference to non-binding mediation (i.e. mediation/conciliation)?” Of the 
354 respondents to the question, the majority (63%) indicated that it is not 
common practice for dispute resolution clauses in commercial contracts to 
make a reference to mediation or conciliation.90 
 The study further sought to assess the structure of the 139 MDR 
clauses. Figure 1 provides a sample of a typical MDR clause.
Figure 1 – Sample Three-step clause
 “Three-Stage Process: Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration
a. Negotiation Between Executives 
The parties shall attempt in good faith to resolve any dispute arising out of or relating to this 
[Agreement] [Contract] promptly by negotiation […].
b. Mediation 
If the dispute has not been resolved by negotiation as provided herein within [45] days after 
delivery of the initial notice of negotiation, [or if the parties failed to meet within [20] days,] the 
parties shall endeavor to settle the dispute by mediation […].
c. Arbitration
 Any dispute arising out of or relating to this [Agreement] [Contract], including the breach, 
termination or validity thereof, which has not been resolved by mediation as provided herein 
[within [45] days after initiation of the mediation procedure] within [30] days after appoint-
ment	of	a	mediator],	shall	be	finally	resolved	by	arbitration	[…].”91
88 The percentages in this article are rounded up.
89 See Cairns, supra note 22. Krauss, supra note 23. See Quek Anderson, “A Coming Of Age 
for Mediation in Singapore” (2017) 29: Sing Ac LJ at 292. See Pace Law School, “Drafting 
Step Clauses: An Empirical Look At Their Practicality And Legality”, online (pdf): Pace Law 
School <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/IICL-NE.html> [https://perma.cc/TG73-PYA4]. 
See Craig Tevendale, et al, “Multi-Tier Dispute Resolution Clauses and Arbitration” (2015) 
1:1 Turkish Com L Rev at 31. See Sai Ramani Garimella & Nizamuddin Ahmad Siddiqui, “The 
Enforceability Of Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clauses: Contemporary Judicial Opinion”, 
(2016) 24:1 IIUM LJ at 166. See Marko Mear, “Enforceability of Mediation in Multi-tiered 
Clauses: the Croatian Perspective” (28 May 2015), online (blog) : Kluwer Arbitration Blog 
: <http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/05/28/12521/> [https://perma.cc/
K7P2-LHD4 ]. See Kah C. Lye, “A Persisting Aberration: The Movement to Enforce Agree-
ments to Mediate” (2008) 20:1 Sing Ac LJ at 1. 
90 See Salehijam, “A Call for a Harmonized Approach”, supra note 46 at 31.
91 Questionnaire Respondent #567. 
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The coding revealed that 80 agreements were two-step clauses, 57 were 
three-step clauses, while 2 called for a four-step dispute resolution process. 
Figure 2 provides an illustration of the most common structure for the 
agreements under analysis. 
Figure 2- Composition of Mediation Agreements
One-step
19%
Two-step
47%
Three-
step
33%
Four-step
1%
Noteworthy is that the majority (84%) of the two-step clauses called for 
mediation/conciliation prior to a binding mechanism.92 This trend was not 
evident in the three-step clauses, which almost all called for negotiation,93 
mediation,	and	finally	arbitration/litigation.	
F. Type of Mechanism: Mediation or Conciliation?
 The choice was made to code separately for conciliation and to 
not treat conciliation and mediation as synonyms during the coding in 
order to demonstrate the rarity of dispute resolution clauses calling for 
conciliation.	Of	the	172	clauses,	only	7	called	for	conciliation.	The	findings	
of	 this	 study	 reaffirm	 the	 shift	 in	 UNCITRAL	Working	 Group	 II’s	 choice	
of terminology in their discussion of an instrument on the enforcement of 
international commercial settlement agreements resulting from mediation. 
The shift from using the term “conciliation” to now “mediation” is explained 
92 Thus, it is not common to require negotiation prior to mediation in a two-step clause.
93 The coder opted to code clauses requiring meeting between the senior representatives as 
“negotiation” although the clause did not explicitly state negotiation. 
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in the advanced copy of the 68th Session “the instruments should refer to 
“mediation” instead of “conciliation”, as it was a more widely used term.”94 
 Furthermore, although the clauses and institutional rules address 
the	process	of	mediation,	it	was	rare	to	explicitly	define	mediation.	Only	five	
institutional	 rules	 address	 the	 definition	 of	mediation,	 namely	 the	 CEDR	
Model Mediation Procedure,95 the NAI Mediation Rules,96 the mediation 
rules of the Institute of Mediations and Arbitrators Australia,97 and the 
Mediation Rules of USA&M.98 
 In addition, despite the active promotion of online dispute 
resolution (“ODR”) especially by the EU through its legislative initiatives,99 
only three clauses called for it. Again, there is disagreement regarding the 
definition	of	ODR.	There	 appear	 to	be	mainly	 two	definitions.100	 The	first	
defines	“ODR”	as	the	use	of	the	internet	or	artificial	intelligence	(AI)	to	guide	
the parties in using ADR. The second is to refer to online dispute resolution 
platforms as “ODR”. For us, relying on technology such as video streaming 
or	file	exchange	software	does	not	change	the	process	the	parties	are	engaged	
in. Therefore, ODR should only cover instances where parties use online 
platforms or AI to resolve their disputes wholly. The lack of reference to 
ODR	specifically	could	related	to	the	fact	that	commercial	disputes	are	often	
resolved outside of the ODR framework with some technological assistance. 
This	 is	 not	 to	 understate	 the	 benefit	 of	ODR,	which	 is	 beneficial	 in	 small	
disputes (low monetary valued), disputes arising from an online transaction 
94 See Working Group II, “Settlement of Commercial Disputes - International Commercial Me-
diation: Preparation of Instruments on Enforcement of International Commercial Settlement 
Agreements Resulting from Mediation” (2018) at 2, online (pdf): UNCITRAL <https://doc-
uments-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V17/083/16/PDF/V1708316.pdf?OpenElement> 
[https://perma.cc/MRQ5-H9E9].
95 See “Model Mediation Procedure” (2018) at 2, online (pdf): Center for Effective Dispute Reso-
lution <https://www.cedr.com/about_us/modeldocs/?id=21>.
96 See “Mediation Rules” (2017) at 6, online (pdf): Netherlands Arbitration Institute <https://
www.nai-nl.org/downloads/NAI%20Mediation%20Rules%201%20January%202017.pdf> 
[https://perma.cc/ZD3D-NQFG]. 
97 See “Mediation and Conciliation Rules” (2001) at 1, online (pdf): The Institute of Arbitra-
tors and Mediators Australia  <https://www.iama.org.au/sites/default/files/resources/
rules-guidelines/mediation-and-conciliation/mcrules.pdf> [https://perma.cc/N2ZE-LLU4].
98 See “Mediation Procedures”  (2018) online: United States Arbitration and Mediation https://
usam.com/mediation-procedures/ >. 
99 EC,  Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 
on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC [2009] OJ L 165/63 [Directive on Consumer ADR]. 
100 See Julia Hörnle & Pablo Cortés, “Legal Issues in Online Dispute Resolution”, (2014) at 1, 
online (pdf): Judiciary UK <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Le-
gal-Issues-Hornle.pdf> [https://perma.cc/PD6X-MV8L]. See Richard Birke & Louise E. Teitz, 
“US	Mediation	in	the	Twenty-first	Century:	The	Path	that	brought	America	to	Uniform	Laws	
and Mediation in Cyberspace” in Nadja Alexander, ed, Global Trends in Mediation (2003) at 
388.
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including consumer disputes, and when parties cannot face each other due 
to emotional or technical reasons.101
 Moreover, it was surprising to see seven clauses calling for binding 
mediation	despite	mediation	being	almost	unanimously	defined	as	a	non-
binding process (Figure 3 provides sample of such agreements). Calling for 
binding mediation contradicts the nature of mediation. It further brings into 
question the validity of the clause.102 
Figure 3 – Sample of a binding mediation clause
 “Any dispute less than $_____________ in value shall be subject to binding mediation 
[…].”103
Lastly, two disputes called for the mechanism that the parties are to resort 
to be determined by the mediation provider and one called for resort to a 
dispute board. It is important to note that when the wording of a mediation 
agreement makes resort to the envisaged mechanism an option (“may”), 
the parties are not bound by a concrete obligation other than to conduct 
mediation.104
G. Scope and Separability
 The disputes that fall within a particular dispute resolution clause 
are determined according to the wording of the agreement.105 In line with 
the widespread requirement for dispute resolution clauses to have a clear 
scope,	95%	of	the	agreements	under	analysis	specified	the	scope	of	disputes	
covered by the agreement. Interestingly, two of the agreements contained 
a	financial	 scope,	which	prevented	 the	mediation	and	arbitration	of	 small	
disputes	(Figure	4	provides	a	copy	of	a	clause	with	a	financial	scope).
Figure 4 – Sample of scope
“In the event the total amount in dispute is higher than USD 50,000, the parties agree to submit 
the Dispute to settlement proceedings under the [insert from approved institutions] mediation 
rules.”106 
101	See	Hopt	&	Steffek,	supra note 9 at 66.
102	Hopt	&	Steffek, supra note 9 at 66. See also Lindsay v Lewandowski, 43 Cal.Rptr (3d) 846 at 
1623 (Cal App 4th at 2006). See Bowers v Raymond J Lucia Companies, Inc 206 724 (Cal App 
4th 2012) 724.
103 See Construction Dispute Resolution Services, “Suggested Contract Language for Construc-
tion-Related Dispute Resolution Alternatives”, online: CDRS <http://www.constructiondis-
putes-cdrs.com/suggested_contract_language_for.htm> [https://perma.cc/38JW-VS2C].
104 See Salehijam, “A Call for a Harmonized Approach”, supra note 46 at 11.
105 See Alexander, “International and Comparative Mediation”, supra note 15 at 190.
106 Questionnaire Respondent #33. 
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Moreover, six clauses addressed separability, with one specifying that the 
mediation portion of the clause is separable from the rest of the dispute 
resolution clause (Figure 5). 
Figure 5 – Sample of separability
 “If any provision hereof is held to be invalid or unenforceable in whole or part, the validity and 
enforceability of the remainder of such provision and other provisions of this Agreement shall 
not	be	affected.”107
In theory, the mediation agreement should be viewed separately from the 
commercial contract as well as the agreement to negotiation and agreement 
to arbitration/litigate. The doctrine of separability is supported on the basis 
of party autonomy, legal certainty, international comity, and the policy to 
give	effect	to	dispute	resolution	clauses.108 In addition, courts recognize the 
separability of mediation tiers from negotiation and arbitration tiers.109 
H. Preconditions to the Mediation Tier
 
 As discussed in Section 3.1 regarding the composition of the 
dispute resolution clauses, there is a tendency for three-step and some 
two-step dispute resolution clauses to require some form of negotiation or 
meeting	 in	the	first	 tier.	This	section	further	discusses	 the	complexities	of	
the preconditions for mediation. 40% of the agreements analyzed required 
the	parties	to	negotiate	or	have	a	meeting	between	specified	persons	prior	
to the mediation. Surprisingly, 11 of these clauses contained a multi-staged 
negotiation/meeting phase, with 72% of the 11 requiring a structured form of 
correspondence prior to the negotiation/meeting.
 Of the clauses establishing a precondition to the mediation, the 
majority	(74%)	specifically	called	for	negotiation	prior	to	mediation.	Again,	
it should be noted that clauses requiring meetings between the parties 
were coded as “negotiation” although they did not explicitly use the term 
“negotiation”.	 20%	 of	 the	 clauses	 calling	 for	 negotiation	 further	 specified	
who must participate in the negotiations, namely “executives with the power 
to	settle”.	Of	the	clauses	calling	for	negotiation,	60%	specified	a	time-frame.	
Both the time-frame and the counting of days varied, ranging from 10 to 
60 days “from the notice of dispute”, “from the invitation to negotiate”, 
“from the date commencement of negotiation”, or “from initial notice of 
negotiation”.
107 Survey respondent clause – emailed 14-03-2017.
108 See Zheng Sophia Tang, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in International Commer-
cial Law, (Oxford: Routledge, 2014) at 74.
109 See Salehijam, “A Call for a Harmonized Approach”, supra note 46 at 4.
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 The remaining clauses with a precondition to mediation called for 
a meeting between managers, directors, senior representatives, or meetings 
between designated dispute representatives. Here the majority (90%) of the 
clauses	specified	a	time-frame.	It	seems	that	when	the	meetings	require	the	
attendance of higher up individuals, the parties are far more concerned with 
specifying the time-frame for the meetings. Again, the time-frame to comply 
as	 well	 as	 the	 rules	 on	 counting	 the	 days	 differed	 amongst	 the	 clauses.	
Ranging from 1 meeting to 45 days “from to the dispute notice”, “request 
notice”, or “the meeting of the executives”.
  Moreover, 14 of the clauses waived the precondition to negotiate 
if	the	parties	failed	to	meet	within	a	specified	time;	ranging	from	10	to	30	
days. 64% of the agreements requiring negotiation stipulated 30 days, 29% 
stipulated 20 days, and 7% stipulated 10 days. There were starting times 
for these periods ranging from “[…] days after the delivery of the notice of 
dispute” to “[…] days after the delivery of notice of negotiation”. 
 Interestingly, one agreement clearly stipulated that the failure to 
negotiate cannot be relied upon to refuse mediation (see Figure 6 for a copy). 
Figure 6 – Sample of failure to negotiate
 “During the course of the mediation, no party can assert the failure to fully comply with para-
graph A, as a reason not to proceed or to delay the mediation.”110
There has yet to be a case where a party refused mediation on the basis of an 
unfulfilled	negotiation	tier.	There	have,	however,	been	several	cases	where	
a	 party	 refused	 to	 arbitrate	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 unfilled	 negotiation	 tier.111 
Therefore,	 it	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	whether	 an	 unfilled	 negotiation	 tier	will	
prevent a party from enforcing the mediation tier. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that scholars and courts remain split as to whether the agreements 
to negotiate are enforceable. Until the Emirates case,112 English judges have 
stipulated that agreements to negotiate are too uncertain to be enforceable, 
while Australian judges supported the enforceability of agreements to 
negotiate.113 
 If parties have stipulated in mandatory terms the requirement to 
negotiate as a condition precedent to mediation, then the principle of pactum 
de non petendo requires the enforcement of such an agreement. However, 
while there are numerous provisions that suspend limitation periods when 
110 See New York City Bar, “Compilation of Sample Mediation Clauses” (2016) at 4, online (pdf):  
NYC Bar <https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20073042-CompilationofSample-
MediationClausesALTDIS442016.pdf> [https://perma.cc/XPD8-A38V].
111 See Emirates Trading Agency Llc v Prime Mineral Exports Private Ltd [2014] EWHC 014 
(Comm).
112 Ibid.
113 See Coal Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v Sijehama Pty Ltd (1991) NSW (24 NSWCA).
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the parties attempt to mediate, there are no such protections in the case 
of negotiations. Therefore, the process of negotiation may endanger the 
parties’ rights. Lastly, if the requirement to negotiate/meet is not stipulated 
in	a	specific	time-frame	and	without	referral	to	who	is	to	attend,	there	is	too	
much uncertainty regarding what is required of the parties. In the words 
of Sheety, “[t]he period of time for negotiation or mediation (which should 
not	be	 too	 long)	 should	be	 triggered	by	a	defined	and	 indisputable	 event,	
such as a written request to negotiate or mediate under the clause or the 
appointment of a mediator.”114
I.  Procedure to Commence/Trigger Mediation
 When parties agree to pursue mediation to resolve their disputes, 
it is important to know how they ought to start the prescribed mechanism. 
As stipulated above, in this study, both the mediation agreement and the 
applicable institutional rules were coded. 60% of the agreements and the 
applicable institutional rules studied described the procedure to commence 
the mediation. The majority of the procedures were contained in the 
applicable institutional rules categorized under the headings “Initiation of 
Mediation”, “Request for Mediation”, or “Commencement of Proceedings/
Mediation”. The most common method to commence mediation was the 
filing	of	a	request	or	application	followed	by	the	sending	of	an	invitation	to	
the other party to participate (Figure 7). 
Figure 7 – Procedure to commence mediation
Invitation, 4%
Invitation, 30%
Request/Application, 67%
Contact the ADR 
Provider, 1%
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Interestingly, 15 agreements contained a time component stipulating 
that	 the	parties	 are	 to	 commence	mediation	 in	 a	 specified	period	 ranging	
from 10 to 90 days. The average number of days was 29.5, while the most 
114 See Sundaresh Menon, Arbitration in Singapore: A Practical Guide (Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) 
at 154.
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common number of days were 15 and 28 (four agreements).115 The markers 
for the start of the time-frame within which the parties must commence 
their	mediation	 ranged	 from	 “from	 the	 file	 being	 sent	 to	 neutral”,	 “from	
notification	 of	 mediation”,	 “after	 request	 for	 mediation”,	 “after	 referral	
to mediation”, “after referral by the contractor”, “from date of mediation 
notice”, “from event giving rise to the dispute”, to “from expiry of time to 
challenge neutral”. While it is rare to regulate the mediation proceedings, in 
Austria, a proponent of regulation of mediation, the beginning and end of 
the mediation are regulated in instances where the parties use a registered 
mediator: “the beginning of the mediation is the agreement of the parties 
that the dispute shall be resolved by mediation. Mediation ends, when a 
party or the mediator refuses to continue the mediation, or when there is 
a	 final	 outcome	 of	 the	mediation	 procedure.”116 Other national mediation 
rules, such as the German Mediation Act as well as the English and the Dutch 
mediation framework, tend to be silent on how mediation is to be initiated. 
J. Applicable Law and Jurisdiction 
 According to Alexander, when parties conclude a mediation 
agreement, they often do not consider future disputes that may arise nor the 
jurisdictions in which the mediation is to take place.117 In this study, only 9% 
of the agreements addressed the governing law of the mediation agreement. 
6%	of	the	agreements	coded	specified	the	governing	law	of	the	mediation.	
Moreover, a mere fourteen agreements (8%) stipulated the jurisdiction with 
power to settle disputes arising from or relating to the mediation agreement. 
Four of those agreements gave the courts where the mediation takes place 
the authority to determine dispute relating to the agreement. 
 Although relatively few clauses designate a governing law for the 
agreement and mechanism, close to 71% of the clauses pre-selected the 
applicable	 institutional	 rules.	 Furthermore,	 five	 of	 the	 institutional	 rules	
indicated that the applicable rules were superior, while nine indicated 
that the content of the agreement was superior. The use of dispute 
resolution	 providers	 in	 mediation	 is	 prevalent.	 This	 was	 also	 confirmed	
by a Pace University Survey of the International Association for Contract 
& Commercial Management (IACCM) members and in-house counsel that 
use MDR clauses. 44% of the respondents indicated that they opt to have 
an institution administer the mediation.118 In our study, only 27% of the 
agreements	coded	specifically	designated	that	the	named	institution	ought	
to administer the mechanism. Nevertheless, it is probable that if parties 
115 1 – within 10 days; 4 –within 15 days; 4 – within 28 days; 3- 30 days; 2 – 45 days; 1 – within 
3 months (90 days from event giving rise to dispute).
116 Art 17 Abs. 1  Law on Mediation in Civil Law Matters (Austria) [Austrian Mediation Act].
117 Alexander, “International and Comparative Mediation”, supra note 15 at 70.
118 “Drafting Step Clauses”, supra note 89 at 9.
143Vol 5 (2018-2019)                 Mediation Clause Decoded:
                   A Systematic Content Analysis     
select applicable institutional rules, they also aim to have the institution 
administer these rules and vice versa.119
K. Third-Party Neutral and Payment
 Reiterating section 2.4, this article does not address the statutory 
and contractual obligations of the neutral, as such obligations are not 
relevant to the discussion of the obligation of the parties to a mediation 
agreement. Nevertheless, for a mediation agreement to be enforceable, it 
must address the selection of the neutral, and in common law jurisdictions, 
his/her remuneration.120 Thus, this study anticipated that the majority of 
the agreements/applicable institutional rules would address the selection 
of	 the	neutral.	Confirming	 this	prediction,	84%	of	 the	agreements	and/or	
the applicable institutional rules contained a procedure to appoint/select the 
neutral. 
 Regarding the remuneration of the neutral, a majority of the agree-
ments/institutional rules (63%) addressed this aspect. The most common 
division (95%) was to equally divide the costs. Evidently, there is a clear 
trend regarding the division of costs. This is key, as it neutralizes the argu-
ment in the Australian case of Aiton,121 that is, that it is not obvious how the 
third-party is to be remunerated.122 Furthermore, in Germany, according to 
Tochterman, when parties do not pre-agree on the payment of the neutral, 
the fees will be determined with reliance on customary hourly rates.123 
L. Logistics: Venue, Language, etc.
 When mediation agreements or the institutional rules address the 
logistics of the mechanism such as the venue, date, and language, the parties 
save considerable time as they do not have to agree on these aspects once a 
dispute arises. According to Tümpel and Sudborough, “ADR clauses often 
do not contain provisions regarding the place and the language of the ADR 
proceedings, although such provisions are often contained in arbitration 
119 Elizabeth Bay Developments Pty Ltd v Boral Building Services Pty Ltd. (1995) 36 NSWLR 
709. The parties, by selecting the ACDC to administer their mediation, had incorporated the 
guidelines by reference. 
120 Salehijam, “A Call for a Harmonized Approach”, supra note 46.
121 Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd, [1999] NSWSC 996 at para 67.
122 Ibid at para 66.
123 Tochtermann, “Agreements to Negotiate”, supra note 52 at 523. See also Jörg Risse, 
Wirtschaftsmediation, C.H. Beck, 2003, 542 at para 9. See Civil Code (Germany) supra note 
59 at art 612.
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clauses.”124	 The	 paragraphs	 below	 outline	 the	 findings	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
above authors’ claim.
 Selecting a “seat”125 for the arbitration seems to be a key factor in 
the parties’ dispute resolution choices. In this study, 63% of the agreements 
studied addressed the venue/location of the dispute, with one agreement 
designating the seat of mechanism. 
 Coding was also carried out to check the parties’ language choices. 
27% of the agreements and the applicable rules addressed how the language 
is to be determined, with one requiring it to be the same language as the 
agreement. Typically, the language is determined by the neutral following a 
consultation with the parties or by the dispute resolution provider.
M. Interim Relief and Provisional Measures 
 
 The power to order interim measures can be concurrent between 
both courts and arbitral tribunals.126 A concern that commonly arises when 
parties agree to mediation is whether the parties may continue to access 
arbitral tribunals or courts to seek interim relief/provisional measures. 
37%	of	 the	 agreement	 addressed	 this	 concern	 by	 specifically	 allowing	 the	
parties to seek interim relief/provisions measures. There were, however, 
two agreements that were confusing as they only addressed the parties’ right 
to seek interim relief/provisional remedies while arbitration is ongoing.127 
Therefore, it was unclear if the parties may rely on such remedies while the 
mediation is ongoing. 
 In principle, mediation agreements should not prevent the 
application for interim measures, as there are certain disputes that may 
require	the	filing	of	suit	in	order	to	prevent	further	harm	(i.e.	IP	disputes).128 In 
such instances, the envisaged dispute resolution mechanism may not always 
be helpful to the parties. Alexander also argues that the temporary waiver 
of	the	right	to	file	a	claim	does	not	affect	the	application	for	certain	interim	
relief, unless there is a contractual agreement to the contrary.129 Moreover, 
there is judicial support for the right to seek interim relief from many courts. 
124 Hannah Tümpel & Calliope Sudborough, “ICC ADR Rules 2001-2010: Current Practices, 
Case Examples and Lessons Learned”, in Arnold Ingen-Housz ed ADR in Business: Practice 
and Issues across Countries and Cultures  (Alphen aan den Rijn, NL: Kluwer Law Internation-
al, 2010) at 261—262 § II.
125 The “seat” implies the legal jurisdiction where the ADR is carried out and therefore the 
supervisory forum and applicable lex fori.
126 Kajkowska, supra note 81 at 222.
127 These agreements were excluded from the count of the total agreements addressing interim 
relied/provisional remedies. 
128	See	DLA	Piper,	“Drafting	an	Effective	Alternative	Dispute	Resolution	Clause	Under	Texas	
Law: News and Insights from Austin” (2012), online: DLA Piper <https://www.dlapiper.com/
en/canada/insights/publications/2012/02/drafting-an-effective-alternative-dispute-reso-
lu__/> [https://perma.cc/C3BL-A5TU]. 
129 See Alexander, “International and Commparative Mediation”, supra note 15 at 205.
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In 2008, the Court of Breda held that safeguarding measures, such as freezing 
orders, are possible despite an ongoing mediation procedure.130 Singapore 
has taken a step further by regulating this right in Article 8(3) of the 2017 
Mediation Act: “(3) The court may, in making an order under subsection (2), 
make	such	 interim	or	supplementary	orders	as	 the	court	 thinks	fit	 for	 the	
purpose of preserving the rights of the parties.”131 In Germany, amongst other 
jurisdictions, this right also exist in the framework of arbitration. §1033 ZPO 
stipulates that “[i]t is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a 
court to grant, before or during arbitral proceedings, an interim measure of 
protection relating to the subject-matter of the arbitration upon request of a 
party.”132 
N. Limitation and Prescription Periods 
 Not all legal systems provide for the suspension or extension of 
limitation periods when the parties engage in mediation. Consequently, the 
parties’ substantive claim may be time-barred. It is important that while the 
parties	attempt	mediation	they	feel	at	ease	that	their	right	to	file	a	claim	in	
courts	or	otherwise	is	not	affected	by	the	termination	of	limitation	periods.133 
The parties can include a provision extension or suspension limitation 
periods in their mediation clause, or a waiver of the right to rely on limitation 
periods for the duration of the mediation.134 19% of the agreements addressed 
this concern, with more than half requiring limitation periods to be extended 
while the other half required their suspension (Figure 8). 
Figure 8 – Sample of limitation/suspension periods
 “RULE 10 Extension of Limitation Period
1. If, during the mediation, a limitation period for bringing any proceedings in relation to the 
Dispute expires, the parties agree that:
a. the limitation period will be extended by the number of days from the date of reference of the 
Dispute to mediation to the date of termination in accordance with these Rules;
b. they will not rely, in any arbitral or judicial proceedings, on expiry of the limitation period 
other than as calculated in accordance with this Rule.”135
“All applicable statutes of limitation and defences based upon the passage of time shall be tolled 
until 15 days after the Earliest Initiation Date.” 
130 Voorzieningsrechter Rechtbank Breda 10 October 2008, LJN BF7611. See also Rechtbank 
Arnhem 18 November 2003, LJN AQ2547 (family case concerning change of husband’s 
assets).
131 Mediation Act (Singapore), (2017) Rep of Singapore Gov Gaz 26 at s 8(3) [Singapore Medi-
ation Act].
132 §1033 Code of Civil Procedure (Germany).
133	Hopt	&	Steffek,	supra note 9 at 34.
134 Kajkowska, supra note 81 at 223.
135 See Resolution Institute, “Mediation Rules” (2016) at 5, online (pdf): Resolution Institute 
<https://www.resolution.institute/documents/item/1897> [https://perma.cc/8Z8Q-E4ZP].
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Although the length of the suspension or extension varied, they never 
exceeded 30 days. The most frequent suspension or extension period was 20 
days. Moreover, it is common for limitation periods to be paused or extended 
while parties attempt to settle their disputes. For instance, with mediations 
in Austria that involve a registered mediator, Article 22(1) of the Mediation 
Act states that “[t]he commencement and subsequent continuation of 
mediation with a registered mediator shall suspend the commencement and 
continuation of the limitation period as well as other notice period regarding 
pursuit of the rights and claims which are subject to mediation.”136 The parties 
may also agree in writing that other obligations and rights between them that 
are	not	subject	to	the	mediation	should	also	be	affected.137 In Germany, art 
203 of the German Civil code (Bürgerliches Gezetsbuch)		specifically	allows	
for the suspension of limitation periods in case of negotiations, and in this 
case, mediation is considered a form of negotiation.138
 In addition, Article 8 of the European Mediation Directive139 
requires Member States to “ensure that parties who choose mediation in an 
attempt to settle a dispute are not subsequently prevented from initiating 
judicial proceedings or arbitration in relation to that dispute by the expiry of 
limitation or prescription periods during the mediation process.” However, 
as the Mediation Directive does not require Member States to implement 
it in relation to domestic mediations. For instance, in Austria, Netherlands 
and England, the Directive does not apply to domestic mediations.140 The 
difference	 between	 the	 rights	 and	 obligations	 implied	 by	 domestic	 versus	
cross-border mediation is especially evident in Austria. As above noted, 
in Austria, mediations involving a registered mediator suspend limitation 
periods, while cross-border mediations that fall under Part 4 of the Cross-
Border Mediation Regulations extend the limitation period until the end of 
the mediation procedure.141 Thus, to protect their legal interests, the parties 
must take action at the latest three months after the end of the mediation. 
Moreover, the parties cannot agree to suspend the limitation period in 
relation to other rights and obligations between them, while this is not the 
case with mediations involving unregistered mediators.142 An issue that 
remains in relation to disputes pertaining to mediation agreements is that 
when the parties dispute their agreement, limitation periods relating to the 
main commercial dispute are not paused. 
136 Austrian Mediation Act, supra note 116.
137 See Frauenberger-Pfeiler, supra note 63 at 22.
138 Civil Code (Germany), supra note 59.
139 See EU Mediation Directive, supra note 14.
140 Ibid at art 1—2.
141 Cross-Border Mediation (Directive) Regulations (UK), 2011, part 4. 
142 See Esplugues, “Civil and Commercial Mediation in Europe” supra note 1 at 702.
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O. Obligation to Refrain from Acting (Pactum De Non Petendo)
 According to Eidenmüeller and Groserichter, mediation 
agreements often address the possibility of competing and/or subsequent 
litigation and arbitration.143 This is because the aim of mediation is to avoid 
parallel proceedings and hence there is typically an obligation for the parties 
not	to	commence	litigation	nor	arbitration	within	a	specific	time-frame	or	to	
have proceedings stayed.144 Some clauses clearly make mediation mandatory 
before the parties may resort to adjudicative process while others require 
that the parties refrain from participating in binding mechanisms while 
mediation is ongoing. As discussed above, there were 125 MDR agreements 
that required mediation prior to a binding mechanism. We further coded 
for agreements as well as institutional rules that precluded a binding 
mechanism if the parties have not initiated mediation or while mediation is 
ongoing. In total, 133 agreements and institutional rules required the parties 
to refrain from litigating or arbitrating before initiating mediation and while 
mediation is ongoing (Figure 9). 
Figure 9 – Sample of institutional rules that prohibit resort to a binding 
mechanism while mediation is ongoing
“Resort to Arbitral or Judicial Proceedings
16. The parties undertake not to initiate, during the mediation, any arbitral or judicial proceed-
ings in respect of a dispute that is the subject of the mediation […].”145 
“§ 8 DUTIES OF THE PARTIES 
(1) […] mediation proceeding must be conducted before the commencement of a court proceed-
ing or an arbitration related to the subject matter of the mediation proceeding.”146 
 Although English judges have on numerous occasions stipulated 
that it must be clear that mediation agreements require mediation as a 
condition precedent to a binding mechanism to be enforceable, the study 
found that many clauses do not say explicitly that the mediation is a 
condition precedent. Often, the clauses stipulate that the parties “shall” or 
“must” mediate, failing which they “shall” resort to a binding mechanism 
(Figure 10 provides an example of a clause that does not explicitly mention 
the word precondition). 
143 See Horst Eidenmüeller & Helge Groserichter, “Alternative Dispute Resolution and Private 
International Law” (2015) SSRN at 8.
144 Ibid.
145 See JAMS, “JAMS International Clause Workbook” (2018), online (pdf): JAMS 
<https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS-Internation-
al-Clause-Workbook.pdf> [https://perma.cc/3TF8-WMH5].
146 EUCON, “Mediation Rules“ (2013) online: (pdf) EUCON https://www.eucon-institut.de/
wp-content/downloads/pdf/EUCON_Mediation_1_Verfahrensordnung_English.pdf> at §8. 
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Figure 10 – Sample of mediation as a condition precedent
 “In the event that the dispute has not settled within twenty-eight (28) days following referral to 
ADC, or such other period as agreed to in writing between the parties, the parties shall submit 
the dispute to arbitration in [insert seat/place of the arbitration].”147
 The agreements coded most commonly prescribed for arbitration 
following mediation,148 15% prescribed litigation, 3% expert determination, 
and less than 1% neutral evaluation. Furthermore, 12% of the clauses did not 
specify a binding mechanism and instead provided for options that parties 
can	choose	from	while	finalizing	their	agreement	(Figure	11).	The	findings	
of this study regarding the obligation to refrain from arbitration are similar 
to the abovementioned survey conducted by Pace Law School, which found 
that 74% end the clause with arbitration.149 
Figure 11 – Obligation to refrain from acting
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When parties provide a time-frame for compliance with the various tiers of 
a MDR clause, there is certainty regarding when that tier can be considered 
exhausted.150 58% of the clauses that obliged the parties to refrain from 
acting	 further	 specified	a	 time-frame	 ranging	 from	10	 to	90	days	with	 an	
average of 53 days. When there is a time-frame, there is a need to clearly 
identify the starting point of such a period. If there is ambiguity, the court 
or	tribunal	might	reach	different	conclusions	regarding	when	the	mediation	
tier can be considered as exhausted.151 Such a scenario maybe result in the 
invalidity of the subsequent arbitral award.152 
 The starting points in our study ranged from “referral to 
mediation”, “appointment of neutral”, “date of acceptance of mediation”, 
“invitation to participate”, “notice of mediation”, “mediation demand”, 
“initiation	of	mediation”,	“from	filing	of	the	request	to	engage	in	mediation”,	
147 See ADC, “ADC Dispite Resolution Sample Clauses” (2015) at 7.
148	63%	of	the	agreements	that	contained	an	obligation	to	refrain	from	acting	specified	arbitra-
tion. 
149 See “Drafting Step Clauses”, supra note 89.
150 See Kajkowska, supra note 81 at 220.
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid.
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to “notice of dispute” (Figure 12).153 The most common starting points were 
“initiation of mediation” and “notice of dispute”. This is in line with Tümpel 
and Sudborough, who found that the average duration of 2001-2010 ICC 
ADR proceedings from transfer to the neutral until the termination of the 
proceedings was around three months.154 
Figure 12 – Sample of agreements with time-frame for the mediation
“If mediation would not resolve the subject matter of the dispute within 30 days after the com-
mencement of the mediation procedure, then either party may commence legal proceedings in 
an appropriate court to resolve the matter.”155
 “If at the conclusion of 90 days after service of the Notice of Dispute […] the parties are unable 
to agree to a mediator, within 45 days after Notice of […] then the dispute shall be resolved by 
binding arbitration [...].”156 
Moreover, 20% of the agreements that contained an obligation to refrain 
from	acting	further	specified	that	the	parties	are	exempt	from	this	obligation	
if the other party fails to participate in the mediation. The study further 
found	two	clauses	that	specifically	allowed	parallel	arbitration,	implying	that	
the obligation to mediate exists, but is not a precondition. The enforceability 
of these two clauses is therefore less certain.
 Lastly, seven clauses in the dataset required the staying/suspending 
of litigation and arbitration while mediation is ongoing. Five of these 
agreements required that the parties apply for the staying of proceedings. 
 When mediation agreements contain not only an obligation to 
submit the dispute to mediation but also a prohibition to commence court 
proceedings or arbitration, they seem to contain two obligations.157 The 
latter obligation is easier to enforce.158 The obligation to use mediation as a 
precondition to litigation and arbitration exists in many jurisdictions159 With 
the exception of the Netherlands, in the jurisdictions under analysis, the 
obligation to refrain from commencing other proceedings is enforceable.160 
Despite being a leader in mediation, in 2006, the Dutch High Court rejected 
153 Days from referral to ADR – 7 days, After appoint of third party neutral – 10 days, After date 
of acceptance – 1 day, After invitation – 2 days, After notice of ADR - 3 days, after written 
demand	–	2	days,	after	initiation	–	20	days,	from	filling	of	request	to	commence	ADR	–	9	days,	
from notice of dispute – 13 days.
154 See Tümpel & Sudborough, supra note 124 at 259.
155 Survey respondent clause 31 – emailed 14-03-2017.
156 Survey respondent clause 56 – emailed 15-05-2017.
157 See Esplugues, “General Report” supra note 6 at 33.
158 Ibid.
159 See Salehijam, “A Call for a Harmonized Approach”,  supra note 46. Tania Sourdin, Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution, 4th ed (Thomson Reuters, 2012) at 356.
160 See Salehijam, “A Call for a Harmonized Approach, supra note 46 at 22.
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the enforceability of agreements to mediate by relying on the voluntary 
nature of mediation.161 
P. Obligation about Time and Time-frames
 As discussed previously under the Sub-section “2.4 Literature 
Review”, the majority of scholars support the idea that a mediation 
agreement binds the parties to at least attend one mediation session/meeting 
before they can unilaterally terminate the mediation. Furthermore, Bach 
and Gruber rely on §2(5) of the German Mediation Act, which states that 
the parties may “end the mediation at any time”, to argue that the wording 
suggests that the parties cannot refuse to mediate, they can only terminate a 
mediation once it has commenced and thus refuse to settle.162 This approach 
was supported in the English cases Leicester Circuits Ltd v Coates Brothers 
Plc163 and Roundstone Nurseries Ltd v Stephenson Holdings Ltd.164 In these 
cases,	the	withdrawal	from	the	mediation	before	the	first	mediation	session	
was sanctioned by refusal to allow recovery of costs.165 
 Scholars agree that the unwilling party should be compelled to hear 
the	other	party’s	offer	and/or	the	mediator	in	order	to	fulfil	their	obligation	
in the mediation agreement.166 More narrowly, in the American case of Fluor 
Enterprises, Inc v Solutia Inc.,167	the	court	held	that	the	plaintiff	had	fulfilled	
a pre-litigation mediation requirement by simply selecting a mediator. 
Therefore,	the	filing	of	an	action	after	the	selection	of	a	mediator,	but	before	
the actual mediation, was deemed appropriate.
	 In	 this	 study,	 the	 code	 “time”	 signifies	 the	 minimum	 time	 the	
parties must participate in the mediation. 38% of the mediation agreements 
contained the code “obligation time/duration”. The majority (85%) of the 
agreements that addressed the obligation about time/duration stipulated a 
minimum amount of time that the parties must participate in the mediation. 
The	 minimum	 time	 ranged	 from	 a	 specific	 number	 of	 hours,	 days,	 or	
sessions. The most common requirement (93%) was for the parties to attend 
a minimum number of sessions/meetings.168 The number of sessions again 
had a varying range (see Figure 13 below). The duration of the mediation 
161 See Liane Schmiedel, “Mediation in the Netherlands: Between State Promotion and Private 
Regulation”, in Klaus J Hopt et al, ed, Mediation: Principles and Regulation in Comparative 
Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 732.
162 See Bach & Gruber, supra note 55 at 166.
163 Leicester Circuits Ltd v Coates Brothers Plc [2003] EWCA Civ 333 Longmore LJ.
164 Roundstone Nurseries Ltd v Stephenson Holdings Ltd [2002] EWHC 1431 (TCC).
165 See Susan Blake, Julie Browne, and Stuart Sime, A Practical Approach to Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution, 1st ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
166 See Bach & Gruber, supra note 55 at 165—166.
167 Fluor Enterprises, Inc v Solutia Inc 147 F Supp 2d 650 (S.D. Tex. 2001). 
168 One agreement required one full day of ADR; Two agreements addressed minimum number 
of hours (4 and 7 hours respectively). 
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is relevant not only to the parties, but also to the mediator and the courts/
arbitrators.169 
Figure 13 – Obligations regarding minimum number of sessions/days
1.92%
11.54%
86.54%
1.92%
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The	findings	of	this	study	correlate	with	a	study	of	court-annexed	mediations	
in Germany, which established that mediations last an average of 2.7 months 
(81 days) and only one session.170 Likewise, according to a Dutch study of 
mediations from 1998 to 2004, the average timeframe for mediation from 
request to settlement is 2.5 months (75 days).171 
a. Rules on Counting Days/Time
 Only 38% of the agreements analyzed designated the date and time 
of the mechanism or a procedure to determine them. Moreover, 34% of the 
agreements contained rules on when the mechanism is deemed to have 
commenced. The most common starting points were “the receipt of request 
by the mediation provider” and “notice of dispute”. It is important to have 
clear guidelines on when the mediation is deemed to have commenced to 
avoid disputes on the matter. For example, a dispute relating to this issue 
arose in the Fluor Enterprises case.172 The parties had agreed to mediate for 
a 30-day period, but disagreed on which actions commenced the procedure 
that set this period in motion. Lastly, only 4% of the agreements contained 
rules on counting days. It is surprising to see a lack of attention paid to the 
rules on counting the days, as 38% of the agreements analyzed contained 
169 See Esplugues, “Civil and Commercial Mediation” supra note 1 at 700.
170 See Reinhard Gregor, “Abschlussbericht zur Evaluation des Modellversuchs Güterichter” 
(2007), online (pdf): Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
<https://www.reinhard-greger.de/dateien/gueterichter-abschlussbericht.pdf>. 
171	See	“Schonewille,	Winst	maken	bij	het	oplossen	van	geschillen:	conflictmanagement	en	
mediation in Nederlandse ondernemingen” (2004), online (pdf): ACB Mediation <http://me-
diationbedrijfsleven.nl/files/marktonderzoek_rapport%20ACB%202004.pdf>.		
172 Fluor Enterprises Inc, supra note 167.
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a time period for the mediation. To reiterate, when there is a time-frame, 
there is a need to clearly identify the starting point of the period. If there is 
ambiguity,	the	court	or	tribunal	might	reach	different	conclusions	regarding	
when the mediation tier can be considered as exhausted.173
Q. Behavioral Obligations
 One of the main challenges of addressing the parties’ obligations 
under a mediation agreement is to know the extent of participation that 
is required of them. In this study, 73% of the clauses and institutional 
rules addressed the parties’ behavioral obligations. The code “behavior” 
relates to the way in which the parties are to behave prior to and during 
the mediation. The obligations regarding behavior were further divided to 
“active participation (prepare and engage)”, “cooperation”, “exchanging of 
information”, “expeditious behavior”, “good-faith”, “serious attempt”, and 
“settle”. The most reoccurring obligations as to behavior were to exchange 
information and to settle (Figure 14). 
Figure 14 –Parties’ Behavioral Obligations 
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a. Exchanging of Information 
 The obligation to exchange information often relates to the need 
to exchange written statements regarding the dispute as well as the details, 
such as names and addresses, of those to be involved in the mechanism. Of 
the	clauses	requiring	the	parties	to	exchange	information,	one	specified	the	
requirement to make oral statements (Figure 15). 
173 See Kajkowska, supra note 81 at 220.
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Figure 15 –Sample of making oral statement
“At the mediation conference, each party should be prepared to make a brief oral statement 
explaining his or her perspective.”174
The duty to provide the third party neutral with information is not regulated 
nor mandated by courts. Nevertheless, the parties are expected not to 
misrepresent the facts.175 The requirement to exchange information is also 
found in civil procedure rules of many states. For instance, although the law 
in England does not explicitly address how a party must behave during a 
mediation procedure,176 there are clear instructions regarding how the parties 
should exchange information prior to litigation in the Practice Direction on 
Pre-Action Conduct.177
b. Settle
 As discussed in the Sub-section “2.4 Literature Review”, there 
is consensus amongst scholars, legislatures and judges that a mediation 
agreement does not require the parties to come to a settlement but merely 
that	they	make	a	real	effort	to	come	to	a	resolution.178 To further study the 
need to settle, this study coded the agreements under analysis for “settle”. 
38% of the agreements addressed the issue of settlement. Of these 65 
agreements, the majority (88%) required the parties to “endeavor” or 
“attempt” to settle their dispute via mediation. Furthermore, two clauses 
required that the parties make suggestions for settlement. Interestingly, 
eight agreements required the parties to settle their dispute via mediation 
using the mandatory language (Figure 16). 
174	See	Johnson	&	Johnson,	“Model	International	ADR	Clause	Pacific	Basin	Option	1”	in	Kath-
leen M Scanlon, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses: Better Solutions for Business (New 
York:	International	Institute	for	Conflict	Prevention	&	Resolution,	2006)	at	129—130.
175 Piers, supra note 15 at 289.
176 Ibid at 292.
177 Ibid.
178 See PPG Industries , Inc. Construction Engineering Service Agreement in Scanlon, supra 
note 174 at 162.; see also Krauss, supra note 23 - no obligation under statute or other law to 
accept a proposed settlement during ADR.
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Figure 16 – Sample of obligation to settle
“Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract or breach thereof shall be 
settled by mediation […].”179
“If any dispute arises in connection with this agreement, the parties agree to enter into medi-
ation in good faith to settle such a dispute and will do so in accordance with the CEDR Model 
Mediation Procedure.”180
Mediation agreements that require parties to settle their dispute via 
mediation are unlikely to be enforced, since a core feature of mediation is 
its non-binding nature.181 Parties cannot be forced to accept a settlement 
proposed by the other party or the neutral whose task is to facilitate the 
dispute resolution process.182 This is in line with the principle of voluntariness 
in mediation, which is also highly valued in Austria and the Netherlands. In 
Germany, §2(5) of the Mediation Act emphasizes the right of the parties to 
end the mediation at any time.183 Likewise, in the US and other common law 
jurisdictions, there is no obligation under state or other law to agree to a 
settlement during a mediation session.184 
c. Act in Good Faith
 The third most common obligation relating to the code “behavior” 
was the requirement to act in good faith.185 However, when parties agree to 
conduct mediation in good faith, there is potential for disagreement regarding 
what good faith entails.186 While it is easy to assess if a party has attended a 
mediation	session,	it	is	more	difficult	to	test	the	good	faith	of	parties	towards	
the negotiations.187	Black’s	Law	Dictionary	defines	“good	faith”	as	“a	state	of	
mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one’s 
duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or 
179  Scanlon, supra note 174 at 162.
180 “Model Mediation Procedure” (2018) at s 9, online (pdf): Centre for Effective Dispute Reso-
lution <www.cedr.com/about_us/modeldocs/?id=21>;
181 See Esplugues, “Civil and Commercial Mediation in Europe”, supra note 1 at 603; also see 
Esplugues, “General Report” supra note 6 at 33, and Mayr & Kristin, supra note 9 at 79. 
182 Piers, supra note 15 at 289.
183 See Mediation Act, (21 July 2012) Federal Law Gazette I 1577 [German Mediation Act].
184 See Rainer Kulms, “Mediation in the USA: Alternative Dispute Resolution between Legalism 
and Self-Determination” in Klaus J Hopt et al, ed, Mediation: Principles and Regulation in 
Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 1279.
185 33% of all agreements.
186 See Paul Stothard, Stuart Bruce et al, “Investment Protection and International Dispute 
Resolution in Singapore” in Denis Brock (ed), Arbitration in Singapore: A Practical Guide, 
(London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 2014). 
187 See Tevendale, supra note 89 at 38. Kulms, supra note 185 at 1279.
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to seek unconscionable advantage.”188 In relation to the obligation to mediate 
in good faith, it can be said to contain the following elements: to conduct 
the mediation, to have an open mind, to be willing to consider settlement 
proposals, and to propose settlement options.189
 Nevertheless, there is reluctance by some common law courts to the 
recognition of the duty of good faith.190 English courts have been traditionally 
hostile to the doctrine of good faith.191 There is no general obligation of good 
faith in English law and the parties have no statutory obligation to tell the 
truth or observe other norms of behavior.192 However, in Carleton,193 the 
English	Justice	Jack	did	find	that	a	party	who	took	an	unreasonable	stance	
in mediation is in the same position as a party who refused to mediate and 
therefore can be sanctioned. Conversely, in the US, the duty of good faith 
is recognized as a general principle of contract law that is implied in all 
commercial contracts.194 According to §205 of the American Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, “every contract imposes upon each party a duty 
of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”195 
Furthermore, good faith is an “overriding and eminent principle” in the 
US Uniform Commercial Code.196 Moreover, in the 1999 Australian case of 
Aiton,	Einstein	J	reflected	on	a	commercial	contract	requiring	the	parties	to	
negotiate in good faith and found that: 
188 “A state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one’s duty 
or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given 
trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage”. 
See Bryan A. Garden, Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed (St Paul, Minnesota: Thomson Reuters, 
2014) at 701.
189 See Alan Limbury, “ADR in Australia” in Arnold Ingen-Housz ed, ADR in Business: Practice 
and Issues Across Countries and Cultures (Alphen aan den Rijn, NL: Kluwer Law Internation-
al, 2010) at 429.
190 See John Cartwright, Contract Law: An Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the 
Civil Lawyer, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2011) at “Part III: the Role of Good Faith”.
191 See Krauss, supra note 23 at 148. See Herbert Smith Freehills, “How Far Can You Act in Your 
Own Self-interest? The Role of Good Faith in Commercial Contracts” (2016), online <http://
hsfnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/01/Contract-disputes-practical-guides-4-
Good-faith.pdf>. 
192 See Jens M Scherpe & Bevan Marten, “Mediation in England and Wales: Regulation and 
Practice” in Klaus J Hopt et al, ed, Mediation: Principles and Regulation in Comparative 
Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 406.
193 Carleton (Earl Malmesbury) v Strutt and Parker, [2008] EWHC 424 (QB).
194 See Steven J. Burton “Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith”, (1980) 94 Harvard L Rev at 371.
195 See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts § 205 (1981). 
196 See Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201 (1952). 
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It is clear that a tension may exist between negotiation from a position of 
self-interest and the maintenance of good faith in attempting to settle dis-
putes. However, maintenance of good faith in a negotiating process is not 
inconsistent with having regard to self-interest.197
In	 Australia,	 the	 obligation	 of	 good	 faith	 is	 sufficiently	 certain	 and	
enforceable.198 
 Lastly, courts in pro-good faith civil law jurisdictions, such as 
Germany, imply the good faith obligation into contractual arrangements.199 
According to §242 BGB, the parties are under a general duty to cooperate 
in the mediation process and to negotiate in good faith. 200 In addition to 
the above duties in the BGB, the parties are bound by the general contract 
law	 requirement	 against	 undue	 influence	 and	 the	 use	 of	 threats	 during	
the mediation procedure.201 §203 of the German Civil code on limitation 
periods202 and the principle of good faith protects the parties from the loss of 
rights during the mediation.203
 However, as Section 3.15 outlines, mediation negotiations 
are	 covered	 by	 confidentiality,	 which	 begs	 the	 question	 of	 how	 the	
parties’ behavior can be assessed.204 It is submitted that the parties’ pre-
negotiation steps (preliminary) leading to the mediation are not covered 
by	confidentiality,	which	mitigates	the	issue	of	proof.	Therefore,	good	faith	
of the parties can be assessed regarding the following steps: answering the 
request to mediate, discussions regarding the choice of neutral, discussions 
regarding the practical aspects of the mechanism, and the need to attend the 
first	session.205
d. Cooperation, Active Participation, and a Serious Attempt
 Referring further to various obligations imposed on the parties by 
their ADR agreement, this study coded for “cooperate”, “active participation 
or prepare and engage”, and “serious attempt.” Forty agreements required 
that parties cooperate (Figure 17), Twenty-eight required active participation 
or to prepare and engage (Figure 18), and two require the parties to make a 
serious attempt (Figure 19).
197 Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd, [1999] NSWSC 996 at para 83. See also United 
Group Rail Service Ltd v Rail Corporation New South Wales, [2009] NSWCA 177 at para 81, 
and Cliff Collieries Pty Ltd v Sijehama Pty Ltd, [1991] NSWLR 24 1 at para 26.
198 See Limbury, supra note 189 at 7.
199 See Alexander, “International and Comparative Mediation”, supra note 15 at 196. In the 
Netherlands, when parties conclude a mediation agreement, they are obligated to negotiate in 
good faith. See Schmiedel, supra note 162 at 731. 
200 See Civil Code (Germany), supra note 59 at  art 242.
201 Tochtermann, “Agreements to Negotiate”, supra note 52 at 549; Piers, supra note 15 at 294. 
202 See Eidenmüeller & Groserichter, supra note 143 at 123. Berger, supra note 76 at 128.
203 Ibid.
204 See van Beukering-Rosmuller & Van Leyneele, supra note 82 at 52.
205 Ibid at 54.
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Figure 17 – Sample cooperate
 “The parties must cooperate fully with the mediator, including by providing all information that 
he or she reasonably requests.”206
Figure 18 – Sample active participation or prepare/engage
“M-9. Responsibilities of the Parties […] the parties and their representatives shall, as appro-
priate	to	each	party’s	circumstances,	exercise	their	best	efforts	to	prepare	for	and	engage	in	a	
meaningful and productive mediation.”207
Figure 19 – Sample make a serious attempt
“By consenting to mediate or conciliate under these Rules, the parties agree to engage in the 
mediation or conciliation in good faith and in a forthright manner and make a serious attempt 
to resolve the dispute.”208
Again, the question arises whether courts can or should impose these 
obligations. In the Austrian context, Frauenberger-Pfeiler comments that 
although the parties are free to negotiate in a way to protect their interests, 
they	may	not	misrepresent	facts,	make	threats,	or	exert	undue	influence.209 
Likewise in Germany, in addition to the duty to negotiate in good faith, there 
is a general duty to cooperate in the mediation process.210 In relation to 
Australia, Magnus notes that “[w]here the parties have agreed on mediation 
[…], there is also a general duty on each party to further the mediation 
procedure in a reasonable way.”211 Thus, a party must cooperate and not 
impede the mediation procedure. 
 The need to cooperate is also stipulated by the Law Society of 
England and Wales in the Civil and Commercial Mediation Accreditation 
Scheme: “Each party must use its best endeavors to comply with reasonable 
requests	 made	 by	 the	 mediator	 to	 prompt	 the	 efficient	 and	 expeditious	
resolution of the disputes. If either party does not do so, the mediator may 
206 Survey respondent clause 3 – emailed 14-03-2017
207 See AAA, “Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses –American Arbitration Association” (2013) 
at 18, online (pdf): American Arbitration Association <https://www.adr.org/sites/default/
files/document_repository/ICDR%20Guide%20to%20Drafting%20International%20Dis-
pute%20Resolution%20Clauses%20-%20English.pdf>.
208 See “Sample Mediation Clause” (2018), online: Chicago International Dispute Resolution 
Association <http://www.cidra.org/samplemediation>.
209 Frauenberger-Pfeiler, supra note 62 at [pinpoint].
210 See Hess & Pelzer, “Regulation of Dispute Resolution in Germany”, supra note 8 at 227.
211  Supra note 80 at 893. At the federal level, see Native Title Act 1993, 1993/110, s 31(1)(b). At 
the state level, see Civil Procedure Act 2005, 2005/28 s 27; Farm Debt Mediation Act 1994, 
1994/91 s 11; Court Procedures Rules 2006 in Court Procedures Act 2004, 2004/50; Uniform 
Civil Procedures Rules 1999, in Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991, 1991/111 s 325. 
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terminate the mediation.”212 English courts have at times used cost sanctions 
against a party acting unreasonably.213 In Halsey v. Milton Keynes Gen. NHS 
Trust, the Court of Appeal set out a test to determine whether the refusal 
to mediate was reasonable.214 Unreasonable behavior includes a refusal 
to mediate, a last minute withdrawal from a planned mediation, making 
an	 offer	 in	 an	 aggressive	 manner	 without	 a	 real	 intention	 to	 resolve	 the	
dispute, and not giving the other part enough time to prepare.215 Bach and 
Gruber take this a step further and argue that the unwilling party should 
be	compelled	to	hear	the	other	party’s	offer,	and/or	that	the	mediator	must	
fulfil	their	obligation	under	the	mediation	agreement.216 
e. Act Expeditiously 
 
 The fourth most common reccurring behavioral obligation was the 
obligation for the parties to conduct the process expeditiously.217 In other 
words, the parties ought not to delay the process unreasonably. There is no 
legal test regarding whether the parties can be deemed to have acted as such.
R. Obligation to Attend in Person 
 Fruitful mediation can only take place if individuals with the 
power to settle (possessing decision-making authority) attend the mediation 
sessions. The code “attendance” denotes agreements that require the 
parties or their representatives to personally attend the mediation. 47% of 
the agreements analyzed require personal attendance by the parties or by 
someone with authority to agree to a settlement. In International Research 
Corp PLC v Lufthansa Systems Asia Pacific Pte Ltd,218 the Singapore Court of 
Appeal	found	that	the	conditions	precedent	to	arbitration	were	not	satisfied,	
as the respondent failed to send their “Director Customer Relations” and 
“Managing Director”. Accordingly, in Singapore, parties are bound by their 
contract regarding who must attend the mediation. 
 The requirement to personally attend a mediation session is found 
in some legislation. In Florida, Rule 1.720(b) of the Civil Procedure stipulates 
212 Civil and Commercial Mediation Accreditation Scheme, Annex C, c. 10
213 See Halsey v. Milton Keynes Gen. NHS Trust, [2004] 1 WLR 3002 at para 16. See also 
Shirley Shipman, “Alternative Dispute Resolution, the Threat of Averse Costs, and the Right of 
Access to Court” in Deirdre Dwyer, The Civil Procedure Rules Ten Years On, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009).
214 Halsey v Milton Keynes Gen NHS Trust, Supra note 213.
215 See Leicester Circuits Ltd v Coates Bros Plc, [2003] EWCA 290 (Eng). See Earl of Malmes-
bury v Strutt & Parker, [2008] EWHC 424 (QB). See Societe International de Telecommuni-
cations Aeronautiques S.C v The Wyatt Co, [2003] EWHC 2401 (Ch) at para 11.
216 See Bach & Gruber, supra note 55 at 165—166.
217 24% of all agreements.
218 International Research Corp PLC v Lufthansa Systems Asia Pacific Pte Ltd and another, 
[2013] SGCA 55.
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that “[i]f a party fails to appear at a duly noticed conference with good 
cause, the court upon motion shall impose sanctions, including an award 
of mediator and attorney’s fees and other costs, against the party failing to 
appear.” 219
 Moreover, in Australia and Germany, personal attendance 
is required unless the parties have agreed otherwise (e.g. via online 
mediation).220 Likewise, in England, mediation may be attended in person 
or via another means of communication (e.g. ODR).221 Conversely, in the 
Netherlands, there is no legal requirement for personal attendance.222 
 The study further coded for whether there were stipulations relating 
to the parties’ lawyers. The code “representation” focuses on whether the 
agreements require the parties to be accompanied by legal counsel. 53% of the 
agreements	specified	that	the	parties	must	have	representatives	consulting	
them. This requirement is perhaps meant to prevent parties from potential 
duress or fraud during the mediation proceedings. Although there are no 
rules against having representatives in the mediation proceedings, some 
argue that, since counsel is often focused on protecting the legal position of 
the parties, he orshe might be too focused on legal rights and duties instead 
of long-term interest.223 There is, however, generally no prohibition of having 
legal representatives join the process as long as the parties to the mediation 
agree.224
S. Obligation of Privacy and Confidentiality
 The SCA revealed that 15% of agreements contained provisions 
regarding privacy (Figure 20) while 70% of the agreements addressed 
confidentiality	(Figure	21).	
Figure 20 – Sample privacy
“9. Privacy
Mediation conferences and related mediation communications are private proceedings. The 
parties and their representatives may attend mediation conferences. Other persons may attend 
only with the permission of the parties and with the consent of the mediator.”225
219 Florida Civil Rules of Procedure (2019), r 1.720.
220 Magnus, supra note 80 at 894 and Tochtermann, “Agreements to Negotiate” supra note 52 
at 555.
221 Scherpe & Marten, supra note 192 at 406.
222 See Schmiedel, supra note 161 at 733.
223 See also Geetha Ravindra, “Role of Attorneys in Mediation Process” at 1, online (pdf): 
American Bar Association <www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/
dispute_resolution/role_of_attorney_in_mediation_process.authcheckdam.pdf>.
224 See Mediation Act (Germany) at s §2(4).
225 Survey respondent clause 22 – emailed 14-03-2017. 
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Figure 21 – Sample confidentiality
“CONFIDENTIALITY Article 16
1. The mediator shall not disclose any information provided to him or her by a party or witness 
without the consent, as appropriate, of that party and witness. 
2. The mediator shall not be compelled to divulge such information, or to testify in regard to the 
mediation in any proceedings unless required to do so by law. 
3.	The	parties	shall	maintain	the	confidentiality	of	the	mediation	and	shall	not	–	except	where	
its disclosure is required by law or is necessary for purposes of implementation and enforce-
ment – rely on, or introduce as evidence in any arbitral, judicial, or other proceeding, any obser-
vations, statements or propositions made before or by the mediator or any documents produced 
in relation to the mediation proceedings.”226
Confidentiality	 is	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 right	 to	 privacy	 in	 the	 US.227 The 
confidentiality	of	mediation	is	one	of	its	purported	benefits.	Confidentially	
is of importance at two levels: between the parties and neutral (inside) 
and between the communications during the process and the outside 
world (outside).228 In the agreements studied, the obligation to maintain 
confidentiality	 was	 often	 imposed	 on	 the	 parties	 as	 well	 as	 the	 neutral.	
The	need	to	protect	confidentiality	of	the	mediation	is	further	reiterated	in	
various legislative acts, including the Mediation Directive.229 However, the 
approach	 to	 confidentiality	differs	 amongst	 the	 common	 law	 jurisdictions	
and continental systems.230
 According to §1(1) of the German Mediation Act,	mediation	is	defined	
as	“a	confidential	and	structured	procedure,	in	which	the	parties	voluntarily	
and on their own responsibility try to achieve an amicable resolution of 
their	conflict	with	the	support	of	one	or	more	mediators.”	231 However, the 
Law	is	not	clear	regarding	the	application	of	 the	confidentiality	obligation	
to the parties themselves. Therefore, it is for the mediation agreement to 
require	the	parties	to	comply	with	the	obligation	of	confidentiality.232 This is 
confirmed	in	the	Netherlands,	where	Article	5	of	the	Cross-Border Mediation 
Law	stipulates	that	confidentiality	of	the	process	must	be	expressly	agreed	
upon by the parties and the mediator in their commencement agreement. 
226 See “P.R.I.M.E. Finance Mediation Rules” (2016) at art 16, online (pdf): P.R.I.M.E. Finance 
<primefinancedisputes.org/files/2017-01/prime-arbitration-and-mediation-rules-v1801171c.
pdf>.
227	See	Susan	Oberman,	“Confidentiality	in	Mediation:	An	Application	of	the	Right	to	Privacy”	
(2012) 27:3 Ohio St J Disp Resol 539 at 542.
228 See Loong Seng Onn, “Mediation” (2015) at 11, online (pdf): Singapore Management 
University <ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4772&context=sol_research>.
229 See EU Mediation Directive, supra note 14 at art 7. See Evidence Act (Austl), 1995/2, s 
131(1).	See	also	Michel	Kallipetis,	“Mediation	Privilege	and	Confidentiality	and	the	EU	Direc-
tive” in Arnold Ingen-Housz, ed., ADR in Business: Practice and Issues across Countries and 
Cultures II (Alphen aan den Rijn, NL: Kluwer Law International, 2010) 183 at 184.
230 See Bosnak, supra note 31 at 650.
231 See Mediation Act (Germany), supra note 223 at §1(1).
232 See, for example, „DIS Mediation Rules“ (2010) at s 10.1, online: Deutsche Institution für 
Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit <www.disarb.org/de/16/regeln/dis-mediation-rules-id31>.
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233 Consequently, the parties and the mediator are free from the obligation 
to testify regarding the information exchanged during the mediation.234 
Likewise,	 in	 Austria,	 confidentiality	 is	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 mediation.235 
However,	 outside	 the	 duty	 of	 confidentiality	 imposed	 on	 the	 mediator,	
the courts do not deem evidence inadmissible if the information became 
knowledge for the parties during the mediation. Thus, a breach of liability 
only	results	in	damages.	To	ensure	compliance	with	a	confidentiality	clause,	
parties	to	an	Austrian	mediation	often	also	include	a	financial	clause	calling	
for	a	heavy	fine	in	case	of	a	breach.236
	 Confidentiality	 is	 also	 protected	 in	 Singapore	 through	 section	
9 of the Mediation Act 2017, which prohibits disclosure of mediation 
communication. 237 Furthermore, section 10 requires permission for the 
admission of mediation communication as evidence in litigation.238 Likewise 
in	 Australia,	 the	 confidentially	 of	 the	 communication	 in	 the	mediation	 is	
protected.239	 Lastly,	 in	 England,	 the	 confidentiality	 of	 the	mediation	may	
be regulated by the parties in the neutral/commencement agreement.240 
English courts will not consider ‘without prejudice’ material, unless privilege 
is waived. 
	 Confidentiality,	 however,	 can	 be	 problematic	 when	 a	 party	 is	
attempting to prove breach of the mediation clause as a result of the other 
party’s actions during the procedure.241 For example, if a party acted in 
bad	faith	during	the	mediation,	the	overriding	protection	of	confidentiality	
233 Supra note 141.
234 In addition, the Netherlands Mediation Institute Mediation Rules contain three principles, 
one	of	which	is	confidentiality:	confidentially	and	secrecy	are	to	be	observed	during	and	after	
the mediation, by all parties concerned. These three basic principles are also found in the 
UNCITRAL Model Rules on Conciliation. See Annie De Roo & Robert Jagtenberg, “The Neth-
erlands Encouraging Mediation” in Nadja Alexander, ed, Global Trends in Mediation (2003) 
at 243.
235 See Marianne Roth & Marianne Stegner, “Mediation in Austria” (2013) 3 YB Intl Arb 367 at 
371. For EU-only mediators, § 3 of the EU-Mediation Act [EU-MA 2011] states that “mediators 
and any other participants in the mediation proceedings are obliged not to testify in court or 
in an arbitration in civil or commercial matters about information they obtained during the 
mediation”. “This means that § 3 of the EU-MA 2011 establishes the obligation to refuse to 
testify for the mediator and any other person involved in the mediation proceedings; yet it is 
only a right to refuse to answer similar to § 321 of the Act on Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessord-
nung), but no legal prohibition of questioning as laid down in § 320 (4) of the Act on Civil 
Procedure for Austrian registered mediators.” See Martin Risak & Christina Lenz, “Austria” in 
Nadja Alexander & Sabine Walsh, ed, EU Mediation Law Handbook, Global Trends in Dispute 
Resolution 7 (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2017) 33 at 55.
236 Risak & Lenz, supra note 230.
237 See Mediation Act (Singapore), supra note 131 at s 9.
238 Ibid at s 10.
239 Magnus, supra	note	80	at	888,	for	“privilege	of	confidentiality”.	
240 See Bill Marsh et al, “England and Wales” in Nadja Alexander & Sabine Walsh, ed, EU 
Mediation Law Handbook, Global Trends in Dispute Resolution 7 (Alphen aan den Rijn, NL: 
Kluwer Law International, 2017) 203 at 228.
241	In	the	US,	privilege	affects	the	parties’	ability	to	prove	breaches	of	obligations	in	mediation.	
See Sarah R. Cole et al, Mediation: Law, Policy & Practice (Thomson Reuters, 2017) at 197. 
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supersedes the possibility to prove the irregular behavior.242 Nevertheless, 
case law originating from the US indicates that the courts have attempted 
to clarify good faith mediations. The court in A.R. Reynolds & Sons243 
sanctioned a party for not participating in good faith on the basis of the 
following	arguments:	 “Availability	by	 telephone	 is	 insufficient	because	 the	
absent	decision-maker	does	not	have	the	full	benefit	of	the	ADR	proceedings,	
the opposing party’s arguments, and the neutral’s input”; “mediation is a 
process in which the parties must work together, with the assistance of a 
trained facilitator, to devise a solution to their dispute”; “passive attendance 
at mediation cannot be found to satisfy the meaning of participation in 
mediation …”; “adherence to a predetermined resolution, without further 
discussion or other participation, is irreconcilable with risk analysis, a 
fundamental	 practice	 in	 mediation”;	 “the	 court	 finds	 that	 the	 counsel	 to	
Wells Fargo sought to control the procedural aspects of the mediation by 
resisting	filing	a	mediation	statement	and	demanding	to	know	the	identities	
of the other party representatives”; “the party representative who was sent 
into the mediation does not appear to have had the authority to enter into 
creative solutions that might have been brokered by the mediator.”244
T. Procedure to Terminate Mediation and Maximum Time Limits
 As mentioned above, the parties can include a mediation tier in 
their MDR clause as a condition precedent to binding processes. Hence, it 
is	important	for	the	parties	to	know	how	they	can	effectively	mark	the	end	
of their mediation proceedings before moving on to arbitration/litigation.245 
There have been several instances where disagreements regarding whether 
the mediation tier had been met have resulted in additional costs. In Allied 
World Surplus Lines Insurance Company v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
of South Carolina,246 the parties had started mediation but the mediator 
did not declare the mediation to be at an impasse and therefore there was 
uncertainty regarding whether the mediation had ended. The court found 
that any ambiguity regarding communication with the parties should be 
resolved in favor of the mediation not ending.247 
 In this study, 65% of agreements contained a procedure to terminate 
the mechanism. There were often several options to end the mediation, 
242 See van Beukering-Rosmuller & Van Leyneele, supra note 82 at 51.
243 See Blake, Brown & Sime, supra note 165 at 107.
244 See In re A.T. Reynolds & Sons, Inc., 424 BR 76 at 85 & 93 (NY Bank 2010).
245 See Strong, supra note 1 at 32—33. “[I]t would be useful to consider what constitutes rejec-
tion or termination of mediation, since there is a considerable amount of debate about that 
particular issue, especially in the context of multi-tiered (step) dispute resolution clauses.” See 
also Born, supra note 23 at 841—849.
246 See Allied World Surplus Lines Insurance Company v Blue Cross and Blue Shield of South 
Carolina, 2017 US Lexis 136983 at 2 (SC Dist Ct).
247 Ibid. Dispute is not ripe and thus dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12 (b)(1).
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ranging from the execution of the settlement agreement; written or verbal 
declaration of the neutral; by a declaration or “notice of declaration” by one 
or all of the parties; no communication between the parties and the neutral 
for X number of days; by the lapsing of the time set for mediation; failure to 
appoint or pay the neutral; by declaration of the dispute resolution provider; 
and	 conclusion	 of	 a	written	 record	 of	 the	 final	 propels	 of	 the	 parties	 and	
the neutral.248 Uniquely, two German dispute resolution providers explicitly 
stipulate	 that	 only	 after	 the	first	mediation	 session,	 can	 the	procedure	be	
terminated.249 § 2 (5) of the German Mediation Act also sets out several 
causes of termination: “The parties can terminate mediation at any time. The 
mediator can terminate the mediation, especially when he is of the opinion 
that autonomous communication or settlement between the parties is not 
to be anticipated.”250	The	wording	of	the	institutional	rules	is	also	reflected	
in Austria. According to §17(1) of the Austrian Mediation Act, the mediation 
terminates upon the declaration of any party.251
 As stipulated above, one of the factors determining the termination 
of the mediation is the time limit set by the parties. Of the agreements 
under analysis, 14% contained a maximum time limit for the mediation. 
The maximum number of days ranged from 15 to 90 days, with the average 
number of days standing at 47.5 days. Additionally, three clauses called for 
three-hour	 long	 sessions.	The	 time	 limits,	 however,	 had	differing	 starting	
marks ranging from “the date of commencement of the mechanism”, “from 
the dispute notice”, “from the mediator receiving instructions”, “from the 
date of submission”, “from the signing of the mediator agreement”, “from 
the referral to mediation”, to “from the request for mediation”. If parties 
wish	for	courts	to	find	certainty	in	their	mediation	agreement,	the	inclusion	
of	a	maximum	time	limit	is	advisable,	as	it	clarifies	when	the	obligation	to	
attempt mediation ends. 
248 See AAA, supra note 207 at 18.
249	Article	5.	Closure	of	the	procedure	“5.1.	After	the	first	mediation	session,	mediation	can	
be terminated at any time by one of the participants as well as by the mediator himself. A 
demolition	of	mediation	is	to	be	justified,	but	there	is	no	claim	to	that	effect”	(Live	Mediation;	
Beispiel einer Mediationklausel). See “Mediation Rules” (2013) at article 13(4), online (pdf): 
< https://www.eucon-institut.de/wp-content/downloads/pdf/EUCON_Mediation_1_Ver-
fahrensordnung_English.pdf >. “ Each party is entitled to terminate the mediation proceeding 
at	any	time	after	the	first	mediation	meeting	in	writing	vis-à-vis	EUCON	and	the	mediator.	The	
mediation proceeding ends two weeks after the receipt of such declaration, unless the media-
tion proceeding continues prior to this deadline amicably”. 
250 Supra note 183.
251 Supra note 116. 
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U. Remedy for Non-Compliance 
 Potential remedies for a failure to comply with a mediation tier 
includes liquidated damages,252 indemnity,253 procedural or substantive 
consequences,	and	specific	performance.254 There is no consensus regarding 
the appropriate remedy for a failure to comply with a mediation agreement. 
When parties do not comply with their mediation agreement, the most 
common remedies are stays and dismissals.255 Parties may draft their 
mediation clause to stipulate a remedy for a failure to comply with the 
agreed procedure. In this study, only 4% of the agreements contained such a 
stipulation. The most common remedy was the right to recover all costs and 
expenses followed by the inability to recover costs.256 
IV. Meeting the Certainty Threshold
 
 This study had a twofold aim. First, to provide a better understand-
ing of the content and obligations contained in mediation agreements and 
second,	to	assess	whether	the	agreements	under	analysis	fulfilled	the	con-
ditions for enforceability in selected states. Turning to our second aim, it 
is undeniable that commercial parties must draft with caution if they wish 
to ensure the enforceability of their agreement.257 For a clause to be bind-
ing, it must indicate with mandatory language that the parties intended to 
be bound by mediation and be certain.258 In common law jurisdictions, the 
parties must also clarify the binding nature of the agreement as a condition 
precedent to other mechanisms.259 Moreover, in all jurisdictions under anal-
ysis, an enforceable agreement should address the following points: 
1. The scope of the agreement (disputes covered);
2. Description of the procedure;
252 Liquidated damages may prove problematic in legal systems that follow the penalty doctrine, 
which makes the clause unenforceable unless it addresses a proportionate estimation of the 
loss. 
253 Indemnity against loss arising from a failure to comply with the ADR obligation avoids the 
difficulties	associated	with	penalty	clauses.	A	promise	of	reimbursement	of	costs	is	problematic	
as	at	times	such	loss	is	unquantifiable.	
254 See Kajkowska, supra note 81 at 222.
255 See Ronán Feehily, “The Contractual Certainty of Commercial Agreements to Mediate in 
Ireland” (2016) 6:2 Irish J Leg Studies 59. Other potential remedies are not discussed in light 
of their rarity. Moreover, consequences such as vacating of arbitral awards are not discussed as 
they do not relate to remedies to a failure to comply with an agreement to mediate. 
256 Five agreements provided for the recovery of costs and two stipulated that the violating party 
cannot recover costs.
257 See Salehijam, “A Call for a Harmonzied Approach, supra note 46.
258 The use of the word “shall” and “must” in dispute resolution clause indicates that the parties 
must	first	to	seek	mediation	before	arbitration	(compulsory).
259 See also ICC International Court of Arbitration Case No. 9984, June 1999: the wording of 
the clause indicated that ADR is an obligation; the tribunals found the clause binding upon the 
parties.
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3. How to initiate the procedure;
4.  Procedure to select the neutral(s) and his/her payment; 
5. The parties’ minimum participation obligations, including 
attendance (personal and time related) and behavior 
(cooperate, meaningful discussions, etc.);
6. The obligation to refrain from acting (i.e. initiating arbitration),
7. Place of the mechanism or method for selection thereof;
8. Time-frame for the mediation or timetable for compliance; and
9. Procedure to terminate mechanism.260 
Additionally,	to	ensure	efficiency,	it	is	advisable	that	the	agreements	address	
the following elements: applicable procedural and substantive law; govern-
ing jurisdiction; applicable institutional rules (attention must be made to 
the version agreed to); consequence for a failure to comply (stay, dismissal, 
damages,	sanctions,	etc.);	effect	on	limitation	periods;	and	the	language	of	
mediation or method for selection thereof. 
 Regarding the common law requirement to use mandatory word-
ing to set mediation as a condition precedent to binding mechanisms, many 
agreements establish the mandatory nature of the mediation through using 
the wording “shall” and “must”. Turning to point (i), 95% of the clauses un-
der	analysis	specified	the	scope	of	disputes	covered	by	the	agreement.	More-
over, all except two agreements described the relevant dispute resolution 
mechanism to be followed. With the majority calling for mediation. Howev-
er,	it	was	rare	for	the	agreements	or	institutional	rules	to	define	mediation.	
Therefore, again, almost all of the clauses also addressed point (ii). 
 Regarding point (iii) “how to initiate the procedure”, 60% of the 
agreements studied described the procedure to commence the mediation, 
while all of the applicable institutional rules prescribed a clear procedure to 
commence	the	mechanism,	with	the	most	common	process	being	the	filing	
of a request or application followed by the sending of an invitation to the 
other party to participate. The large majority of the agreements (84%) also 
addressed the selection of the neutral and therefore also complied with point 
(iv), while a lesser percentage (63%) governed his/her payment, but com-
monly required the costs to be equally divided.
 Turning to how the agreements addressed the parties’ participation 
obligations (v), the picture is less clear. As eloquently noted by Jarrosson, 
without doubt, the most troublesome question in mediation, at the pres-
ent stage of tis development, is how to define the precise obligations of the 
parties.261 The study coded for the following obligations: behavioral obliga-
tions, obligation to attend in person, and obligations regarding privacy, and 
confidentiality.	73%	of	the	agreements	and	institutional	rules	coded	address	
the parties’ behavioral obligations. The most reoccurring obligations as to 
260 See Salehijam, “A Call for a Harmonized Approach”, supra note 46 at 11—12.
261 See Jarrosson,  “Legal Issues 2010” supra note 40 at 163. 
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behavior were to exchange information and to attempt/endeavor to settle. 
Good faith was the third most common obligation followed by the duty to 
cooperate, participate actively as well as to be prepared and to engaged in the 
mechanism. Furthermore, almost half of the agreements required personal 
attendance by the parties or for someone with authority to settle. The most 
common requirement was for the parties to attend at least one mediation 
session/meeting. In addition, 70% of the clauses required that the parties 
and	the	neutral	ensure	confidentiality	of	the	proceedings	while	15%	of	the	
agreements addressed privacy. 
	 Arguably	 the	most	 important	 effect	 of	mediation	 agreements	 re-
lates to the obligation to refrain from arbitration/litigation (point (vi)). 77% 
of the agreements and applicable institutional rules prohibit parties from 
engaging in binding mechanism while mediation is ongoing. Slightly more 
than half of the agreements that required the parties to refrain from acting 
further	specified	a	time-frame	that	averaged	around	53	days	(point	(viii)).	
 In relation to the obligation to refrain from acting, it is important to 
know how the mediation can be terminated (point (ix)). Again, the majority 
of	the	agreements	(65%)	outlined	specific	procedures	or	factors	that	would	
bring the mediation to an end, with 14% setting a maximum time-frame for 
the mechanism (again, point (viii)).
 Lastly, despite the importance of pre-selecting the governing juris-
diction and applicable law in order to have legal certainty when a dispute 
arises, only a minority of the agreements (8% and 9% respectively) addressed 
these	aspects.	Moreover,	only	19%	of	the	agreements	specifically	stipulated	
that the parties had the right to seek interim relief/provisional measures. 
 From the above, it is clear that many of the agreements under 
analysis had a high level of compliance with the general conditions for en-
forceability. However, the majority of the agreements incorporated institu-
tional rules and therefore it remains to be seen if clauses calling for ad hoc 
mediation would meet the threshold for enforceability. The next section, in 
concluding this work, outlines a potential solution to the currently drafting 
problems. 
V. Concluding Remarks
 
 Through an in-depth content analysis of 172 agreements, this 
study aimed to uncover common practice/trends regarding the rights and 
obligations implied by mediation agreements. Subsequently, these results 
were tested against the current conditions for enforceability, resulting in the 
conclusion that the large majority of the agreements would likely be found 
enforceable	as	they	addressed	essential	elements	sufficiently,		especially	since	
they tended to call for institutional mediation. However, the issue remains 
that parties have a tendency to copy and paste their dispute resolution 
clauses, which may give rise to uncertainty. Therefore, it is suggested that the 
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common trends detected in our studied be relied upon by legislators to create 
default rules that can counteract potential gaps in mediation agreements. 
 In absence of default rules, a simple omission might result in the 
invalidity of a mediation agreement. For instance, if a mediation agreement 
fails to address the remuneration of a neutral, the courts in certain 
jurisdictions,	such	as	in	England	and	Wales,	will	find	the	clause	to	be	void	
for uncertainty. Default rules can provide standard solutions for problems 
typical	to	these	agreements.	The	positive	effect	of	default	provisions	for	the	
promotion of mediation can be based on the success story of arbitration; 
arbitration frameworks of many jurisdictions contain default rules. 
 Any potential default rules should consider addressing the following 
factors: how to initiate procedure; the scope of the agreement (disputes 
covered); applicable procedural and substantive laws; procedure to select 
the neutral(s) and the payment of the neutral; place of the mechanism or 
method for selection thereof; language of mechanism or method for selection 
thereof; the parties’ obligations including attendance, behavioral, temporal, 
etc.; obligation to refrain from acting; consequence for a failure to comply 
(stay, dismissal, damages, sanctions, etc.); and the procedure to terminate 
the mechanism as well as time-frames. Nevertheless, further research is 
needed regarding best practices regarding the enforcement of mediation 
agreements. While the study was successful in uncovering trends in the 
dataset, it is advisable that more agreements be studied to provide for more 
representative	findings.	
